Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law by Wexler, Lesley
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 28 Issue 1 
2006 
Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified 
and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law 
Lesley Wexler 
Florida State University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the State and Local Government 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified and Non-Self-Executing 
Treaty Law, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. (2006). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol28/iss1/1 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
TAKE THE LONG WAY HOME: SUB-FEDERAL
INTEGRATION OF UNRATIFIED AND
NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATY LAW
Lesley Wexler*
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 2
II. FITTING SUB-FEDERAL INTEGRATION INTO THE
TREATY COMPLIANCE DEBATE ................................................. 6
A. Norm -Based M odels ............................................................ 7
B. Rational Choice Models ................................................... 10
C. How Do Treaties Influence Sub-Federal Action? .............. 12
III. C ASE STUDIES .......................................................................... 16
A. The Kyoto Protocol .......................................................... 16
1. B ackground .............................................................. 16
2. Sub-Federal Action .................................................. 18
B. The Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants .......................................................... 20
1. B ackground .............................................................. 20
2. Sub-Federal Action .................................................. 21
C. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women .................................. 23
1. B ackground .............................................................. 23
2. Sub-Federal Action .................................................. 24
D. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination ................................................ 26
1. B ackground .............................................................. 26
2. Sub-Federal Action .................................................. 27
E. Assessing Sub-Federal Integration Through
Compliance Theory ....................................................... 28
IV. COMPARING SUB-FEDERAL INTEGRATION
AND RATIFICATION .................................................................. 32
A. Distinguishing Treaty Ratification and
Sub-Federal Integration ................................................... 32
1. B enefits .................................................................... 32
2. Costs and Burdens .................................................... 36
B. Will Sub-Federal Integration Influence
Federal Ratification? ........................................................ 38
* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Many thanks to Lisa
Bernstein, Gerald Rosenberg, Alan Sykes, Adrian Vermeule, Douglas Baird, Rachel Brewster,
Dave Fagundes, Michael Horowitz, Jonathan Masur, Erin Simpson, Brian Galle, the Univer-
sity of Chicago Legal Scholarship Workshop, and Loyola University Chicago School of Law
Faculty Workshop.
Michigan Journal of International Law
V. LIMITS ON STATE AND LOCAL POWER ....................................... 41
A. Textual Lim itations ........................................................... 42
B. Preemption and Dormant Powers .................................... 43
V I. C ONCLUSION ............................................................................ 48
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the oft-repeated adage that most countries comply with most
international law most of the time,' rational choice and realist scholars
suggest that international law matters little to powerful countries able to
opt out of its regimes.2 Conventional wisdom suggests the United States
often prefers to go it alone rather than submit to the constraints of human
rights and environmental treaties . For instance, the United States re-
cently announced it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.4 Similarly, the
United States has long abstained from many prominent human rights
treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Even when the United States does join multilateral environmental
and human rights treaties, these treaties often languish in Congress with-
out domestic implementing legislation Given this trend, this Article
suggests the focus on ratification ignores the significant ways in which
unratified and unimplemented treaties influence social change in the
United States.
Sub-federal entities such as states and cities provide a meaningful
but under-theorized entryway for treaty norm integration and implemen-
tation.6 Currently, two views dominate the literature on the role of human
1. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed.
1979).
2. See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions,
INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1994-95, at 5; KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1979).
3. See Matthew Vespa, Note, Climate Change 2001: Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech,
29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 395, 418 (2002); Christopher Wall, Human Rights and Economic Sanctions:
The New Imperialism, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 577, 593 (1998).
4. David A. Wirth, The Sixth Session (Part Two) and Seventh Session of the Confer-
ence of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 648,
649 (2002).
5. Two examples include the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57, and
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S 195.
6. Existing literature is just beginning to address the role of sub-federal actors in im-
plementing unratified and non-self-executing treaties. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Dialogic
Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United
States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001); Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exception-
alism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006);
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rights treaties in domestic law. The first, mostly embraced by treaty ad-
vocates, characterizes these treaties as duplicative of existing domestic
protections and promotes them as a baseline for other countries to inter-
nalize.' The second view, espoused mostly by international law skeptics,
laments these treaties as substantively misguided or unwarranted intru-
sions upon existing constitutional arrangements.8 Both camps presume
that less developed countries will accrue the vast majority of whatever
treaty benefits exist. Similarly, most scholars and advocates presume that
the technology transfer and knowledge distribution associated with envi-
ronmental treaties flow in one direction-from more advanced to less
advanced countries.9 This Article contests this understanding of treaties
by investigating instances in which sub-federal actors in the United
States act independently of treaty ratification or federal implementing
legislation by directly incorporating international human rights and envi-
ronmental treaties into domestic law.
Sub-federal entities can integrate treaty norms by passing legislation
that self-consciously implements treaty provisions or by approving ordi-
nances and resolutions that urge federal treaty ratification. For example,
if the United States had declined to sign and ratify the Montreal Protocol
on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, California could still inte-
grate the Montreal Protocol by restricting resident companies'
production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and funding CFC-friendly
alternatives. California could learn from the experiences of treaty-
compliant countries and also use the Montreal Protocol language itself to
help draft its legislation. Rather than view the treaty as evidence of a
binding obligation, as it might if the United States had ratified the treaty,
California could rely on the existence of the treaty as evidence of an
Barbara Schulman, Effective Organizing in Terrible Times: The Strategic Value of Human
Rights for Transnational Anti-Racist Feminisms, 4 MERIDIANS: FEMINISM, RACE, TRANSNA-
TIONALISM 102 (2004); Stacy Laira Lozner, Note, Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations:
The San Francisco CEDAW Ordinance and the New York City Human Rights Initiative, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 768 (2004). See also Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International
Regime: The Domestic Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 40 How. L.J. 571, 594 (1997) (arguing that civil rights groups should promote
implementation of and compliance with the CERD through pressure to submit reports and
litigation); Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An Interna-
tionalized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 15, 21-22 (1996) (contending that
domestic rights groups need to be more internationalized by promoting ratification and creat-
ing linkages with international colleagues).
7. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599 (1997) (book review).
8. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Do-
mestic Law?, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 327, 333-35 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 445-47 (1998).
9. See Cheng Zheng-Kang, Equity, Special Considerations, and the Third World, I
COLO. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 57, 64-65 (1990).
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international consensus on the seriousness of the depletion of the ozone
layer and the need for immediate state-level legislative attention.
Similarly, California, Washington, and Oregon could draft a memo-
randum of understanding whereby each state committed to specified
CFC phase-outs that were pegged to the Montreal Protocol reduction
levels. They might also agree to uniform reporting requirements as de-
veloped within the regime and meet regularly to discuss progress and to
brainstorm new ways to achieve future CFC reductions. In another sce-
nario, which actually occurred, the United States eventually ratified the
Montreal Protocol, but Congress delayed passing implementing legisla-
tion for a significant period of time. A parallel process of sub-federal
integration occurred when the city of Denver chose to phase out CFCs in
accordance with the treaty prior to the passage of federal implementing
legislation. °
In a second type of sub-federal integration, the city of Amherst,
Massachusetts, could pass an ordinance calling on the United States to
ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Rather than implement-
ing the treaty's substantive provisions, Amherst could simply express its
solidarity with the international community and urge the United States to
change its position on the treaty.'I
Finally, a city or state could simultaneously adopt both strategies of
treaty integration. For example, the state of New York could urge federal
ratification of the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families' 2 at the
same time that it passes legislation providing immigrants with access to
various social services guaranteed by that treaty. Such legislation might
mimic legislation passed by a country that had ratified the Migrant
Workers treaty as well as require enhanced data collection from relevant
state agencies to develop a contextualized sense of migrant workers'
day-to-day problems. In turn, the resulting data could be used to craft
future legislation to help migrant workers and their families.
Treaties were once limited to seemingly external matters between
countries,'3 but now that they include internal matters such as individual
human rights and domestic environmental regulation, sub-federal actors
10. Eight states and many cities, including Denver, actually adopted such policies. See
Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Policies, 86 FOREIGN POL'Y 158,
175 (1992).
11. This symbolic action might make particular sense when a city lacks the resources to
integrate a treaty, or a treaty creates obligations that only federal legislation can address.
12. Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
13. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1967 (1999).
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play a greater role in treaty implementation. 4 Existing literature already
recognizes that sub-federal actors often help integrate treaty law into
domestic law and act as the locus of transnational networks.'5 This Arti-
cle adds to that observation by contending that such integration does not
always happen at the behest of the federal government. Rather, this Arti-
cle examines several case studies in which sub-federal actors undertake
this integrating role even as the federal government ignores or abandons
a particular treaty.
Legal scholars tend to focus on ratification and related litigation as
the relevant mechanism for treaty norm internalization.' 6 Norm-based
theorists argue that the articulation of norms through treaties can help
reframe human rights and environmental debates and subsequently shape
domestic law. Conversely, rational choice scholars suggest that treaties
do little work of their own in shaping domestic behavior and instead con-
tend that, to the extent norms matter, they simultaneously drive both
treaties and any domestic push for social change. Thus far, the debate
about the effect of these treaties has generally been limited to an exami-
nation of ratifying countries. Yet, another strategy for achieving
compliance with human rights and environmental treaty norms exists.
Despite claims that treaty ratification is a necessary precondition for the
consistent observance of international human rights and environmental
standards, 7 empirical evidence suggests social movements and govern-
ment actors may encourage sub-federal actors to implement treaties in
the face of federal apathy, ambivalence, or even hostility.
Part II of this Article introduces the longstanding treaty compliance
debate and expands it to include the question of whether treaties influ-
ence sub-federal actors in nonratifying countries. This Part draws on
norm theory to conclude that sub-federal actors may use treaties and
treaty processes as: (a) a framework to understand the underlying sub-
stantive issue, (b) a way to reduce drafting costs, (c) a focal point to
measure compliance, (d) evidence of an international consensus, (e) a
mechanism to express or signal a cosmopolitan identity, or (f) a spring-
board to criticize the current administration.
14. See generally Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Con-
trol Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2004).
15. Id.
16. See infra Section II.C. See also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the
Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 182 (2003). For a view that ratifi-
cation is often negatively correlated with compliance, see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
17. Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, International Human Rights Norms and Domes-
tic Change: Conclusions in the Power of Human Rights, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 234, 276-77 (Thomas Risse et al. eds.,
1999).
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Part III explores several case studies of sub-federal integration of
human rights and environmental treaties-the Kyoto Protocol on Cli-
mate Change, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). These case studies
highlight the shortcomings of both norm-based and rational choice theo-
ries in explaining sub-federal integration. They also challenge the
prevailing view that international norm internalization is a one-way
process flowing from the United States and other developed countries to
less developed and newly democratizing countries.
Part IV attempts to distill which treaty costs and benefits accrue only
to a ratifying country and which can be fully captured through sub-
federal action. This Part also identifies some of the limits on federal
norm internalization by identifying procedural and political barriers to
treaty ratification and the passage of federal implementing legislation. In
addition, this Part suggests that the norm-based theorists' predictions
about sub-federal action inducing ratification should be tempered by ra-
tional choice insights about national as opposed to local preferences.
Finally, Part V grapples with the constitutional and political con-
straints on sub-federal integration of treaties. Constitutional constraints
include textual limitations, active preemption, and the dormant treaty
power. Nevertheless, this Article posits that, notwithstanding an expan-
sive view of federal preemption, sub-federal actors possess many options
in bypassing federal unwillingness to ratify treaties or pass implement-
ing legislation.
II. FITTING SUB-FEDERAL INTEGRATION INTO THE TREATY
COMPLIANCE DEBATE
The debate surrounding whether and how treaties influence domestic
practices has spawned a substantial subfield,' but this literature says lit-
tle about the role of sub-federal actors in countries that choose not to
ratify or implement treaties. This oversight obscures the mechanisms
through which sub-federal entities can "bring international law home."
This Part introduces competing compliance theories to help situate the
practice of sub-federal integration. It also explains why the insights of
norm-based models, with their focus on persuasion and treaty manage-
ment, ought to be extended to treaty nonmembers. Similarly, this Part
suggests why the insights of rational choice models, with their focus on
18. See William C. Bradford, International Legal Compliance: An Annotated Bibliog-
raphy, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 379 (2004).
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welfare maximization, also help illuminate some of the treaty nonmem-
bers' practices.
A. Norm-Based Models
Norm-based models of international law suggest that ideas, con-
structed and transmitted through transnational interactions, influence
government behavior above and beyond self-interest.'9 Multilateral trea-
ties frequently articulate, codify, and publicize these ideas. Norm-based
models assume that countries then join these treaties because they care
about both their direct welfare gains and their reputations as reliable
members of the international community.
20
The managerial school is a prominent norm-based model. First ar-
ticulated by Abram and Antonia Chayes, the managerial school
maintains that countries comply with international law out of a combina-
tion of enlightened self-interest and effective reporting, verification, and
monitoring requirements. 2' The managerial approach assumes that most
treaty regimes tolerate a "significant level of noncompliance or free rid-
ing,"22 but that willful treaty violations are only occasional. This view
contends that most violations stem from (1) ambiguous and indetermi-
nate treaty language;23 (2) limited economic or technical capacity to
24comply; and (3) unforeseen changes in circumstances.
The transnational legal process school, associated most closely with
Harold Koh and Anne-Marie Slaughter, provides a complementary
norm-based model.25 In addition to emphasizing the interactions where
global norms are debated and interpreted (as stressed by the managerial
school), proponents of this approach argue that legal scholars should also
assess the manner in which domestic legal systems internalize treaty
norms.26 The transnational legal process school focuses on the mecha-
nisms by which a country can signal its internal acceptance of the
19. See generally Oona Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory
of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 481 (2005).
20. George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International
Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S100 (2002).
21. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COM-
PLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
22. Id. at 150.
23. The focus on treaty language and rule indeterminacy draws from Thomas Franck's
theory of compliance pull. He contends that treaties exert compliance pull through the fairness
of the process that creates the treaty mandates as well as the fairness of the application of the
rules. The determinacy of the rules, general application of the rules, and the rules' bases in
equitable principles establishes the legitimacy of the treaty regime. THOMAS FRANCK, FAIR-
NESS IN IN.ERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
24. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 21, at 10.
25. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
26. Koh, supra note 7, at 2602.
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treaty's dictates. 27 Generally, this process of internalization begins with
the transnational interactions that lead to the emergence of a global
norm, which international law subsequently articulates and refines.
Countries then "bring international law home" through domestic inter-
nalization of the global norm.2' Transnational legal process theorists
suggest that this domestic internalization generally occurs at the federal
level through the executive, legislative, or judiciary and then trickles
down to sub-federal units.29 Ratification and domestic implementing leg-
islation therefore kick-start the domestic internalization process. The last
stage of internalization occurs when a country assumes an independent
sense of obedience in following the norm.30
Thus, norm-based theories predict that the best compliance rates ac-
company treaties that establish international bureaucracies to help
resolve the indeterminacy in their treaty provisions and provide technical
and financial assistance for their implementation.3" Managing compli-
ance requires transparency in order to facilitate coordination of the treaty
norms and provide reassurance of other members' compliance.32 As a
result, norm-based theorists argue that treaties should develop uniform
self-reporting systems with standardized data collection, measurement,
and analysis procedures.33 Reporting requirements should be specific and
include preliminary assessments of future policies and programs to pro-
mote compliance)4 Countries should discuss and debate the content of
reports. Treaty parties should also frequently conduct meetings and pro-
vide other forums that involve the discussion of thorny treaty issues and
encourage compliance from reluctant treaty parties. Treaties need
enough flexibility to account for significant economic, social, and politi-
cal changes either through amendments or protocols.36 Finally, parties
should use the treaty regime to help develop domestic enforcement
schemes through technical and bureaucratic training.
The normative model is not without critics. For example, proponents
of the enforcement model critique the managerialists' reliance on persua-
sion and positive incentives to explain treaty compliance.37 Under the
27. Id. at 2641.
28. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home,
35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 625-26 (1998).
29. See id. at 646-54.
30. Id. at 679-80.
31. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 21, at 271,276-77.
32. Id. at 135-53.
33. Id. at 154-73.
34. Id. at 167.
35. Id. at 228-49.
36. Id. at 225-27.
37. See George Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996).
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enforcement model, definitive dispute resolution options, combined with
robust economic or military sanctions, drive treaty compliance.38 Coun-
tries comply with treaties for fear that their violations will be noticed and
punished.3 9 The ideal treaty regime requires credible verification mecha-
nisms and clear rules in order to detect cheaters. Such a regime also
requires the political will to enforce sanctions.4 0 A more moderate ver-
sion of this model suggests that sanctions may not be essential to treaty
compliance, but notes that enforcement-backed international law is more
likely to change behavior than international law without enforcement
mechanisms.4'
Others criticize the failure of the managerial school to describe accu-
rately the state practice associated with many human rights treaties.
Many states only weakly implement treaties' reporting requirements,S41
much less their substantive requirements. In particular, the United
States often shirks its reporting obligations by submitting late or cursory
reports.43 Similarly, ratification-induced legislative changes stemming
from human rights treaties seem to be quite limited in the United
States.'4 At best, litigation provides a limited supplement to the reporting• 41
functions. Moreover, the empirical studies on compliance with human
rights treaties are fairly discouraging-they suggest ratification may dis-
courage human rights protection in oppressive countries, although
ratification in democratic countries with strong civil societies may
38. See id. at 386, 391-92
39. For a discussion of this approach, see Antonia Handler Chayes & Abram Chayes,
From Law Enforcement to Dispute Settlement: A New Approach to Arms Control Verification
and Compliance, 14 INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1990, at 147.
40. Downs et al., supra note 37, at 392 (discussing the WTO and the Maastricht Treaty
as empirical support for the enforcement model, as the WTO automatically authorizes retalia-
tion for trade violations and the Maastricht Treaty allows domestic law sanctions for
violations).
41. Id. at 379. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 500-01. This is particularly true for coun-
tries that do not believe that international law creates an independent obligation.
42. Treaty bodies generally receive country reports once every four years and spend
about six hours considering the report with little follow up. NGOs often lack ample time and
notification to fully comment on the reports or attend the treaty proceedings. See Anne F
Bayefsky, The UN Human Rights Regime: Is It Effective?, 91 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 460,
467 (1997).
43. Kenneth Roth, The Charade of U.S. Ratification of International Human Rights
Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347, 349 (2000).
44. Id. (identifying the only concrete domestic legislative changes from the genocide
convention as the establishment of civil and criminal liability for torture and the explicit pro-
hibition on genocide).
45. See Laurence H. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 338-66 (1997) (noting the weaknesses of the
Human Rights Committee in adjudicating cases).
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improve human rights behavior.46 General compliance with environ-
mental treaties is also quite weak, "7 and U.S. compliance is best when its
domestic legislation predates the treaty.48 Given these findings, some
scholars are beginning to argue that domestic integration of treaty norms
is substantially more important to treaty compliance than norm enforce-
ment through treaty mechanisms.
49
B. Rational Choice Models
Rational choice models of international law, by contrast, assume
"[s]tates engage in consequentialist means-end calculations, and state
interests can be deduced from the state's material characteristics and the
objective conditions it faces."50 In addition, most rational choice scholars
assume these preferences are "relatively stable across time and across
issues."5' Rational choice literature generally focuses on the state as the
relevant unit of analysis, while sub-state and nongovernmental actors
tend to be peripheral.
Rational choice scholars dispute the presumed causal linkage be-
tween the adoption of treaties and compliance with them. While modem
rational choice scholars have abandoned the early realist contention that
treaties "exist and are enforced only when they serve the interests of the
46. Four major empirical studies assess whether ratification of human rights treaties
improves domestic behavior. See Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties
Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925 (2005) (suggesting that
ratification exacerbates human rights violations in countries with no civil society, but that the
more democratic the society is and the stronger a country's civil society, the more beneficial
the effects of ratification); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a
Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, Ill Am. J. Soc. 1373 (2005) (finding
ratification is often associated with a worse human rights record, but that citizen participation
in international governmental organizations is associated with a better human rights record);
Hathaway, supra note 16 (finding ratification is often associated with worse human rights
performance, although the opposite is likely true for fully democratic states); Linda Camp
Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make
a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999) (concluding ICCPR
ratification did not affect civil and political rights or personal integrity rights).
47. See Emeka Duruigbo, International Relations, Economics and Compliance with
International Law: Harnessing Common Resources to Protect the Environment and Solve
Global Problems, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 177, 178 (2001).
48. See Michael J. Glennon & Allison Stewart, The United States: Taking Environ-
mental Treaties Seriously, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 173 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobsen
eds., 1998).
49. Christof Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The Impact of United Nations Human Rights Trea-
ties on the Domestic Level, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 483, 487 (2001).
50. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 478-79.
51. Robert 0. Keohane, Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and
Limitations, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S307, S308-09 (2003).
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most powerful states, 5 2 they do suggest that treaties generally reflect
rather than shape interests,53 especially for those able to dictate the treaty
terms. To these scholars, empirical evidence suggesting moderate to high
levels of compliance is merely proof of strong preexisting underlying
interests.
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner posit four possible explanations for
treaty membership . First, some treaties reflect a coincidence of interests
between the parties.55 Such treaties embody preexisting interests rather
than attempts to change the behavior of any participating country. Sec-
ond, coordination games may explain some instances of treaty
membership: each country can best recognize its interests if a group of
countries engages in identical actions.56 Third, treaties arise when coop-
eration yields long-term benefits. For example, two countries may forgo
territorial gains in each of their short-term interests and instead agree to
a border treaty with a framework to monitor violations that allows both
countries to realize long-term gains from stability and provides a frame-
work to monitor violations.57 Finally, treaties may also arise through
coercion. A weak state might accede to a powerful state's demand that it
join a treaty even if the weaker state prefers the status quo, because it
realizes the powerful state has already decided to alter the political real-
ity such that the status quo is no longer a viable option."
The rational choice model aptly explains high levels of noncompli-
ance with human rights treaties and moderate compliance with
environmental treaties. For example, rational choice scholars argue that
52. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 478. For a discussion of such early views, see id. n.1 9.
53. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005).
54. Id. at 11-13.
55. Under this rationale, a country acts in a particular manner to satisfy its own inter-
ests regardless of the actions of other countries. If two or more countries have the same
interests, they will develop a treaty to reflect this coincidence of interests.
56. For example, rules of the road develop in such a manner. It does not matter if cars
drive on the right or left side of the road; what matters is that all drivers decide to drive on the
same side rather than leaving it to individual choice. See Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and
Convention at the Foundations of Law, I I J. LEGAL STUD. S 165, S 183-84 (1992).
57. Cooperation also explains bilateral arms control treaties such as the ABM Treaty
between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Both countries had long-term in-
terests in weapons parity, but felt unilateral disarmament would jeopardize their short-term
interests. When the United States no longer viewed its treaty partner as a threat, it with-
drew. See Wade Boese, U.S. Withdraws from ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, July-Aug. 2002, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/
abmjulaug02.asp.
58. For instance, a less powerful country might prefer to negotiate individual trade
agreements, but the existence of the WTO changes the background against which all countries
operate. If the United States, Europe, and Japan want to conduct trade through the WTO,
smaller countries may join even though the treaty regime does not best facilitate their inter-
ests. See LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD (2000).
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the end of the Cold War, coordinated responses to abuses, and internal
pressure explain existing levels of compliance for human rights treaties.
Norm entrepreneurs can publicize violations of human rights abuses re-
gardless of a country's treaty membership status. Likewise, treaties may
be used to influence domestic politics or convey the seriousness of a
state's desire to be bound, and yet they may exert no independent com-
pliance pull.
Rational choice theories can also explain why powerful countries
such as the United States might actively negotiate treaties without ulti-
mately joining them. The United States may elect to remain outside the
Kyoto Protocol because it imposes significant costs for a diffuse envi-
ronmental benefit, which provides relative gains to other countries. The
United States might also stay out of the treaty in order to maintain lever-
age over other noncompliant countries. Similarly, the United States has
not joined human rights regimes such as the CEDAW because it objects
to specific elements of the treaty regime and has seemingly little to gain
from domestic implementation. The United States ratified the CERD, but
as the treaty is non-self-executing, it imposes little cost at the national
level without corresponding implementing legislation.
In addition to the implicit criticisms leveled at rational choice mod-
els by the prevailing assumptions of norm theorists, some have criticized
rational choice models for treating states as unitary actors despite the
presence of varied domestic actors and preferences. 9 Others have criti-
cized as unduly simplistic the notion that international law is purely
interest maximizing. 60 Similarly, rational choice models do a poor job of
explaining how states' interests change or new problems are recognized
in a world without a corresponding change in the distribution of material
resources. In other words, rational choice has a difficult time accepting
or explaining non-security interests.
C. How Do Treaties Influence Sub-Federal Action?
Neither norm-based nor rational choice models, as currently applied,
fully explain the practice of sub-federal treaty integration. Treaty makers
focus on ratification as essential to domestic integration.6' Yet even with-
59. Alexander Thompson, Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The
Promise and the Pitfalls, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S285, S292-93 (2002).
60. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 479-81.
61. For instance, the CERD drafters and supporters did not foresee local implementa-
tion as a possible compliance mechanism. Rather they thought, as one commentator noted,
"all ultimately depends upon the ratifications of the convention and the recognition by the
ratifying States of the competence of the Committee established to consider communications
from individuals ... claiming to be victims of a violation ... by a State Party .... NATAN
LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMI-
NATION 13 (2d ed. 1980).
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out federal ratification or implementing legislation, treaties can influence
nonmembers through sub-federal action. Treaties precipitate sub-federal
action by producing a fully articulated framework by which to under-
stand the problem underlying the treaty; reducing drafting costs for
welfare-maximizing legislation; providing focal points that cities and
states can use to measure compliance; offering evidence of an interna-
tional consensus on the existence of, and approach to, a problem; and
presenting an instrument to express and signal a cosmopolitan self-
identity.
First, treaties provide a framework in which to conceptualize and
comprehensively understand an underlying problem as well as delineate
specific rights and obligations. In many ways, treaties are the "interna-
tional articulation of [their underlying] norms., 62 They are a highly
visible compilation of the underlying substantive goals and values. They
may encourage government actors to see a problem in a particular way
and pass legislation that goes beyond the treaty's mandates. Moreover,
treaties can offer the conceptual framework through which social move-
ments engender change.63 While the early civil rights movement was
mostly home-grown in the United States, international law and interna-
tional social movements have informed second- and third-generation
human rights movements. The end of World War II sparked international
interest in human rights protections and culminated in numerous multi-
lateral human rights treaties. Similarly, the burgeoning environmental
movement turned to treaties as a mechanism for effecting change. Trea-
ties provide an umbrella under which to organize domestic litigation and
legislation. This framework development theory fits more easily with
norm-based approaches than with rational choice accounts, which have a
difficult time explaining the emergence of social movements or what
makes such movements effective beyond material considerations.
Second, treaties and subsequent implementing legislation can pro-
vide off-the-rack legislative solutions to cities and states. Rather than
invest in developing their own legislation, sub-federal actors can copy
from preexisting legislation. Sub-federal integration demonstrates that
cities and states now include material derived from treaties when they
make legislative decisions. Treaties can also help spawn best practices
from which sub-federal actors can choose. Of course, cities and states
will not always elect approaches from among existing treaty options.
62. Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 121, 122 (2001).
63. When social change is desired, movements need to have a conceptual framework.
For example, while the civil rights movement used both litigation and legislation, larger prin-
ciples of equality and justice unified the movement's actions. Their conceptions of these
principles informed all of their strategies.
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Rather, sub-federal integration simply demonstrates that treaties can
have an effect beyond treaty parties. This perspective is consistent with
rational choice accounts: once cities or states decide that they face a par-
ticular problem, they can assess the costs and benefits of existing
legislative approaches to that problem. They can piggyback their efforts
on the copious amounts of research and debate that go into drafting a
treaty. Still, mere welfare maximization fails to explain why some cities
and states emphasize the international aspect of the legislation. They
could easily pass legislation that mimics a treaty without calling atten-
tion to the legislation's origin.
Third, treaties can provide a focal point by which cities and states
match their regulatory behavior with the international community. Focal
points can help facilitate the resolution of both cooperation and coordi-
nation games. 6 For instance, a treaty that sets up a system for measuring
pollution reduction may influence nonmembers to adopt the same meas-
uring system so that all can compare reductions using the same baseline.
Cities and states need not think the measuring system is the best option,
nor must they think they will be sanctioned for using a different system.
Rather, the treaty provides them the opportunity to coordinate their be-
havior with other actors without creating a separate binding agreement.
Admittedly, private individuals and institutions can also provide focal
points, but the binding nature of treaties makes them a more public and
visible focal point than many other possibilities.65 Both rational choice
and norm-based models can accommodate the idea of focal points. Ra-
tional choice models certainly recognize the importance of both
coordination and cooperation, while norm-based models help articulate
why the treaty law may appear a more natural and salient focal point
than other options.
Fourth, the very existence of treaties in force provides proof of an in-
ternational consensus66 on the existence of, and approach to, a problem.
While sub-federal actors are not bound by a treaty or the norms it articu-
lates, they can use the treaty's widespread acceptance as a justification
for adoption through an appeal to consensus and acquired knowledge. A
significant number of ratifications can add to the persuasiveness of a
treaty's provisions by highlighting the broad agreement of the interna-
tional community to undertake binding obligations. States may not
ultimately fulfill these obligations, but treaties conceptually differ from
purely aspirational or hortatory soft law in that states precommit to par-
64. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1649, 1651 (2000).
65. Id. at 1654, 1668-69.
66. Albeit, such consensus may be limited.
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ticular behavior. Moreover, treaties that emerge from preexisting soft law
indicate a growing and deepening consensus about the validity of the
treaty norms.67 Norm-based models do a much better job than rational
choice accounts of acknowledging this aspect of treaty influence because
they focus more on the importance of persuasion to compliance with
international law.
Sub-federal actors may also support treaties to express or signal a
cosmopolitan identity. Cosmopolitanism suggests individuals ought to
identify themselves as members of the world community prior to or in
addition to identifying themselves through national or local allegiances.68
Given individuals' difficulties in actualizing cosmopolitan motivations,
governments might be better suited to undertake cosmopolitan obliga-
tions.69 This identity can be encouraged through adoption of human
rights treaties, which, in emphasizing the intrinsic value of all humans,
are inherently cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitan ends can also be achieved
through self-consciously identifying domestic legislation with a treaty,
which asserts membership in the global community when more formal
mechanisms such as treaty ratification are unavailable. City or state gov-
ernments may do so to satisfy a domestic constituency or to signal
membership in transnational society to the rest of the world. Rational
choice models have a difficult time grappling with cosmopolitanism be-
cause they presume states and other actors seek to maximize their own
welfare rather than the welfare of others. They also have difficulty ex-
plaining the attractiveness of sub-federal integration to states or other
governmental actors that have not experienced any change in their mate-
rial interests.
Finally, sub-federal integration, particularly that which merely calls
for federal ratification, may be a way to cheaply and visibly criticize the
presidential administration or Congress. Urging ratification of a rejected
treaty places the sub-federal actor in stark contrast to the relevant federal
actor without assuming the costs of implementing the treaty's substan-
tive provisions or the burdens of accepting the treaty's procedural
processes.
67. For instance, both the 1924 League of Nations Declaration of the Rights of the
Child and the 1948 and the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child strongly inform
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
68. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY:
DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 3, 4-6 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
69. Martha C. Nussbaum, Toward a Viable Cosmopolitanism, Castle Lecture 4 at Yale
University (Mar. 1, 2000), cited in Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan
Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1671 n.14 (2000).
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III. CASE STUDIES
This Part develops four case studies to explore the various aspects of
and reasons for sub-federal integration of treaty law. These case studies
stem from human rights and environmental treaties because prospects for
federal ratification and implementing legislation are limited in these ar-
eas (unlike trade), and sub-federal actors enjoy wide latitude to act in
these areas (unlike security). This Part examines two unratified environ-
mental treaties-the Kyoto Protocol and the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants-along with one non-self-executing human
rights treaty-the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination-and one unratified human rights treaty-the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Each case study includes a brief discussion of the federal negotiating
position and the ensuing sub-federal attempts at integration. This Part
concludes with an assessment of how these case studies fit within the
norm-based and rational choice models and identifies the benefits de-
scribed above, such as reduced drafting costs or focal points for
coordinating progress, that drive the sub-federal integration process.
A. The Kyoto Protocol
1. Background
In the last ten years, the specter of global warming has increasingly
occupied the public consciousness.0 As a result of growing concern,
countries negotiated the Kyoto Protocol, which commits developed
countries already at a high level of greenhouse gas emissions to reduce
overall emissions to five percent below 1990 levels by 2012.' It encour-
ages national policies to enhance energy efficiency, protect carbon sinks,
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.72 Developed countries may jointly
meet their commitments through the use of tradable permits. 73 The Pro-
tocol currently imposes no reduction requirements on developing
countries such as China and India.
The United States actively participated in the Kyoto Protocol nego-
tiations, securing significant objectives such as flexible timetables for
emission reductions, the inclusion of all greenhouse gases, and the al-
70. Jon A. Krosnick et al., The Impact of the Fall 1997 Debate About Global Warming
on American Public Opinion, 9 PUB. UNDERSTANDING Sci. 239, 239 (2000).
71. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 3.1, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
72. Id. art. 2.1 (a).
73. Id. art. 4.1.
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lowance for a cap-and-trade permit system . In particular, the tradable
permit mechanism drew heavily from the United States' domestic ex-
periences with such systems. 5
Despite early enthusiasm from the Clinton administration, the U.S.
Senate vociferously opposed the Kyoto Protocol. In July 1997, the Sen-
ate issued Resolution 98, which declared the United States should not
sign the Kyoto Protocol if (a) it was likely to cause serious harm to the
U.S. economy, or (b) it did not expand to commit developing countries
to future reductions. Congress also added restrictive language to appro-
priations bills prohibiting the use of federal funds to implement the
Kyoto Protocol prior to ratification.77 President Clinton signed the Kyoto
Protocol, but fearing defeat, he declined to submit the treaty to the Sen-
ate for ratification. President George W. Bush, on the other hand,
openly stated his opposition to the Protocol and criticized the treaty for
excluding "80 percent of the world. '79 The Bush administration also wor-
ried about the treaty's significant compliance costs.0 Given these
concerns, the United States seems unlikely to join the Kyoto Protocol
any time in the near future.
74. The Kyoto Protocol and Its Economic Implications, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Energy and Power of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 105th Cong. 14-16 (1998)
(statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural
Affairs, Department of State).
75. William D. Nordhaus, After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warm-
ing, FOREIGN PoL'Y Focus, Mar. 27, 2006, available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3167.
76. Byrd-Hagel Resolution: Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the Condi-
tions for the United States Becoming a Signatory to Any International Agreement on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (passing 95-0).
77. Gregg VanHelmond, Squandering the Surplus: $11 Billion on the Unratified Kyoto
Protocol, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 17, 1999, at 4-5, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/BG1322.cfm.
78. See Thomas C. Schelling, What Makes Greenhouse Sense? Time to Rethink the
Kyoto Protocol, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2002, at 2, 2.
79. Letter from George W. Bush, U.S. President, to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and
Roberts (Mar. 13, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html. But
Bush left open the possibility of future administrations reviewing and joining the Protocol in
2012. U.S. Out of Kyoto for a Decade-At Least, COOLER HEADS NEWSL. (Competitive Enter.
Inst., Washington, D.C.), May 18, 2002, available at http://cei.org/gencon/014,03017.cfm.
80. The costs of U.S. compliance range anywhere from twenty-six to 250 dollars per
ton of carbon. Worst case estimates suggest U.S. compliance could cost 475 billion dollars.
John P. Weyant & Jennifer Hill, Introduction and Overview to ENERGY J., SPECIAL ISSUE, THE
COSTS OF KYOTO PROTOCOL: A MULTI-MODEL EVALUATION vii (1999), available at
http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/kyoto.aspx.
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2. Sub-Federal Action
Many cities and states criticized President Bush for creating a regu-
latory void on greenhouse gases. 8' The explicit disavowal of the Kyoto
Protocol spawned multiple sub-federal efforts.82 For instance, the U.S.
Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, passed in 2006, "urge[s] the fed-
eral government and state governments to enact policies and programs to
meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol target of reducing global warming pol-
lution levels to 7% below 1990 levels by 2012." 3 The agreement also
encouraged Congress to pass the Climate Stewardship Act, which would
create a national tradable permit regime." Signatory cities also made a
voluntary commitment "to meet or exceed Kyoto Protocol targets" them-
selves.85 So far, 418 mayors have joined the agreement."
The International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
(ICLEI) will monitor implementation of the Mayors Agreement as part
of the Cities for Climate Protection program.87 The Cities for Climate
Protection, which includes more than 500 cities88 in thirty countries, 9
includes enough municipalities to account for "more than eight percent
of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions." 9 The program seeks to
81. See J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy
Issue for Corporate Counsel-it's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 96-101
(2004).
82. In addition to the examples discussed in the text, Berkeley and Santa Cruz both
endorsed the Kyoto Protocol. KyotoUSA, http://www.kyotousa.org.
83. 2005 Adopted Resolutions: Endorsing the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection
Agreement, U.S. Conference of Mayors (2005), http://usmayors.org/uscmresolutions/
73rdconference/en_0 1.asp.
84. This language has since been removed and the agreement now urges general na-
tional legislation on the matter.
85. Id.
86. Seattle.gov, Office of the Mayor, U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement,
http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/mayor/climate/default.htm#who.
87. INT'L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL ENVTL. INITIATIVES, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUS-
TAINABILITY (n.d.), available at http://www.iclei.org/documents/Global/brochures/ICLEI-
BrochuretextENG.pdf. In 1993, the ICLEI began the Cities for Climate Protection campaign to
build a worldwide movement of local governments who adopt policies and implement measures
that achieve measurable reductions in local greenhouse gas emissions, improve air quality, and
enhance urban livability and sustainability. Id.
88. Konrad Otto-Zimmermann & Karen Alebon, ICLEI: Working with Cities to Promote
Sustainable Development, HABITAT DEBATE (United Nations Human Settlements Programme,
Nairobi, Kenya), Sept. 2002, at 4, available at http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/getPage.asp?page=
periodView&period= 1949.
89. AUSTRL. GREENHOUSE OFFICE, CITIES FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION AUSTRALIA
(2005), available at http://www.greenhouse.gov.aulocallccp/publications/ccp2005.html.
90. Klaus Bosselmann, Rio Plus 10 Minus 20: The decline of the UNCED process and
the failure of Johannesburg, at 14 (n.d.), http://win.dante.co.nz/3080/attachments/docs/anew-
nz-plan-432.doc.
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integrate the Mayors Agreement into the Kyoto Protocol by acting as a
broker for private business and household reductions. 9'
The Cities for Climate Protection program also promotes city-to-city
cooperative opportunities. For example, four U.S. cities and three Japa-
nese cities are comparing climate protection strategies and sharing
available research.92 Fort Collins, Colorado, and Cebu City in the Philip-
pines have completed a climate-related agreement to exchange technical
and practical know-how in the waste management field. 93 Similarly, Mi-
ami-Dade County is working with local Mexican authorities to jointly
implement their Cities for Climate Protection initiatives.94 Meanwhile,
other cooperative opportunities are emerging.
ICLEI also maintains a database of best practices and encourages
conferences and seminars to facilitate information exchanges.95 It is cur-
rently developing a multilingual database to allow cities to share
"emission inventories, reduction targets, and mitigation action plans.' 96
Along with the international interactions, ICLEI also promotes extensive
domestic communication through numerous workshops and a leadership
council dedicated to informing member cities of new scientific develop-
ments and emerging policies, as well as "actively engag[ing] local
elected officials in promoting the benefits of local climate protection
strategies. 97
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade
system for nine Atlantic states, is another example of a sub-federal initia-
tive developed in response to federal reluctance to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol. Initiated by New York governor George Pataki in 2003, the
RGGI created a regional carbon market for power plant emissions, with
aspirations of creating a model for future national policy.9 The RGGI
contemplates the possibility of inviting other countries to join or work
within existing international frameworks 99-- discussions of links to
91. INT'L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL ENVTL. INITIATIVES, CARBON TRADING AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (1999) (on file with author).
92. Int'l Council for Local Envtl. Initiatives, Cities Partner for Climate Action (n.d.)
(on file with author).
93. INT'L CITY/COUNTY MGMT. ASS'N, GLOBAL PROBLEMS ... LOCAL SOLUTIONS:
2001 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2001), available at http://www.makingcitieswork.org/files/pdf/
ResourceCities/RCAnnualReportO I.pdf.
94. Int'l Council for Local Envtl. Initiatives, Miami-Dade County to Work with Mexico,
(n.d.) (on file with author).
95. Otto-Zimmermann & Alebon, supra note 88, at 4.
96. CCP Campaign Heats Up, INITIATIVES, Dec. 2004 (Int'l Council for Local Envtl.
Initiatives, Toronto, Can.), available at http://www6.iclei.org/ICLEI/news36.
97. Otto-Zimmermann & Alebon, supra note 88, at 5.
98. Reg'I Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm.
99. Id.
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European carbon trading systems are already underway.'0° In addition,
Maine and Connecticut have both begun to implement RGGI by passing
legislation formally adopting the regional goals of RGGI.' °'
The RGGI acts as a governmental information and regulatory net-
work. State officials share past experiences with greenhouse gas
regulation, listen to expert briefings, and attempt to harmonize relevant
regulations.' 2 The RGGI website serves as a repository for much of the
shared information. The RGGI also engages in data gathering and tech-
nical analysis to help develop model rules for other states. 0 3 In addition,
RGGI states are creating a greenhouse gas registry that could be inte-
grated with other pollution registry efforts.
In many ways, the RGGI emerged in the shadow of the Kyoto Proto-
col. For instance, the emission reductions are pegged to 1990 levels-a
self-conscious effort to mimic the Kyoto Protocol.' 4 The ongoing efforts
to design the cap-and-trade system draw from other countries' experi-
ences under Kyoto.' °5
So far, the Bush administration and Congress have not directly re-
sponded to either the Mayors Agreement or the RGGI. While Congress
has not passed preemptive legislation and no federal actors have initiated
litigation, the federal government has stopped short of endorsing the
106
programs.
B. The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
1. Background
Longstanding concern about agricultural and industrial chemicals
culminated in the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
100. Peter Fontaine, A New World Order, Pua. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 2005, at 26.
101. DAVE ALGOSO & MICHAEL GOGGIN, NEW ENGLAND CLIMATE COAL., GETTING ON
TRACK: NEW ENGLAND'S RISING GLOBAL WARMING EMISSIONS AND HOW TO REVERSE THE
TREND (2005), available at http://vpirg.org.
102. Reg'I Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 98.
103. Reg'] Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Action Plan, http://www.rggi.org/action.htm.
104. David R. Jones, In Northeast, Republicans, Democrats Join to Forge Carbon Trad-
ing Market, INSIDE ENERGY WITH FED. LANDS, Mar. 28, 2005, at 6.
105. TONY DUTZNIK & ROB SARGENT, NAT'L ASs'N OF STATE PIRGs, STOPPING
GLOBAL WARMING BEGINS AT HOME: THE CASE AGAINST THE USE OF OFFSETS IN A RE-
GIONAL POWER SECTOR CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 10, 11, 15 (2004).
106. Instead, the executive branch has developed a variety of voluntary international
programs and the Clear Skies Initiative to deal with global warming. For example, the Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development, Energy Security, and Climate Change created a
nonbinding agreement to focus on the development of energy efficient technology. See Press
Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: President Bush and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development (July 27, 2005), http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/50314.htm.
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Pollutants.' 7 The Stockholm Convention bans the production and use of
the so-called "dirty dozen" chemicals,' 8 minimizes the permissible use
of certain chemicals in Annex C,'09 and provides for a precautionary ap-
proach to the future regulation of still other chemicals." The convention
also requires ratifying states to participate in information exchanges,"'
public education campaigns," 2 and research, development, and monitor-
ing on persistent organic pollutants (POPs)."3
As with many environmental treaties, the United States played an
important role in negotiating the Stockholm Convention. "4 In May 2001,
the United States signed the convention and President Bush has been
aggressively promoting ratification. ' Despite such support, the treaty
has languished after having been submitted to the Senate for advice and
consent. Congress has only recently begun to address the necessary pre-
cursor legislation for ratification. ' 6 Even if the Senate ratifies the treaty,
it is likely to reject the Stockholm Convention's mechanism for adding
new chemicals outside the dirty dozen."
7
2. Sub-Federal Action
While many domestic actors have taken action on POPs prior to the
Stockholm Convention, a few states seem to have responded directly to
the treaty."' For instance, Maine's 2001 legislation on dioxin takes lan-
guage directly from the treaty in articulating the state's policy "to reduce
the total release of dioxin and mercury to the environment with the goal
of its continued minimization and, where feasible, ultimate elimina-
tion."" 9  Similarly, Washington state's draft rule on persistent
107. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M.
532 [hereinafter Stockholm Convention].
108. Id. art. 3.
109. Id. art. 5.
110. Id. art. 8.
111. Id. art. 9.
112. Id. art. 10.
113. Id. art. ll.
114. See Letter from George W. Bush, U.S. President, to the Senate of the United States
(May 6, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020507-8.html.
115. Id.
116. Lauren Morello, Chemicals: Second House POPs Bill Sent to the Floor, ENV'T &
ENERGY DAILY, July 28, 2006.
117. CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW, U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION FOR THE STOCK-
HOLM POPs CONVENTION (2006), available at http://www.ciel.org/Chemicals/Stockholm-
USImplementing.html.
118. See generally CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW, U.S. STATES AND THE GLOBAL POPS
TREATY: PARALLEL PROGRESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST Toxic POLLUTION (2005).
119. An Act to Reduce the Dioxin from Consumer Products into the Environment, ch.
277, 2001 Me. Laws S.P. 479-L.D. 1543, available at http://janus.state.me.uslegis/ros/lom
LOM I 20th/6Pub251-300/Pub251-300-51 .htm#P 1424_277970.
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bioaccumulative toxics (PBTs) also uses language from the Stockholm
Convention in stating that a "lack of full scientific consensus should not
be used as a justification for delaying reasonable measures to prevent or
minimize harm to human health or the environment.'
20
Moreover, California's ban on lindane has provided it with an oppor-
tunity to influence additions to the Stockholm Convention. Lindane is
considered one of the most likely pollutants to be included in the Stock-
holm Convention's future bans. 2 NGOs have made submissions to
treaty bodies emphasizing the success of the California lindane ban.
22
California's ban has encouraged New York, Washington, Maine, and
Michigan to adopt similar bans. 23 The EPA has also announced a ban,
but the FDA still permits its use.1
24
Cities have also taken action on persistent organic pollutants. In
2002, Seattle passed a resolution to "phase out the purchase of products
that contribute to persistent toxic pollution.' 25 Buffalo, Boston, San
Francisco, and Oakland all have taken action to eliminate or reduce
PBTs.' 26
The federal government has been relatively quiet about these sub-
federal actions. The EPA supported California's ban on bromated flame
retardants and lindane despite its clear authority to preempt such legisla-• 27
tion. The Bush administration, however, is now pursuing legislation
that would preempt sub-federal actors from "establish[ing] or con-
tinu[ing] ... any requirement that is applicable to a POPs [sic] chemical
substance or mixture.' 28 In addition, as mentioned above, current Stock-
holm Convention implementing legislation would not require the EPA to
120. Washington State PBT Rule Advisory Committee, Draft PBT Rule (proposed Dec.
8, 2004), available at http://www.ecy.wa.govlprograms/ea[/pbtlrule/docs/conclusion/draft-
rulestrikethrough.pdf.
121. Kristin Schafer, Lindane: Partial Ban in California Spurs Action in Other States,
GLOBAL PESTICIDE CAMPAIGNER, Aug. 2004, at 12, 13, available at
http://www.panna.org/resources/gpc/gpc_200408.14.2.pdf.
122. See, e.g., Patricia Miller & Kristin Schafer, Int'l POPs Elimination Network, Sub-
mission of Information on Lindane Pursuant to Article 8 of the Stockholm Convention as
Specified in Annex E of the Convention (2005), available at http://www.oztoxics.org/poprc/ Li-
brary/Lindane%20IPEN%20Comments%20for%20POPRC.pdf.
123. Schafer, supra note 121, at 12.
124. All Agricultural Uses of Lindane to End in North America, ENVTL. NEWS SERVICE,
Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/aug2006/2006-08-10-09.asp.
125. Rose Marie Williams, POPs Treaty, TOWNSEND LETTER FOR DOCTORS AND PA-
TIENTS, May 1, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 7008456.
126. Friends of the Buffalo Niagara Rivers, City of Buffalo Resolution for PBT-Free
Purchasing (2004), http://www.fbnr.orglPBT.htm.
127. Tracy Daub, Note, California-Rogue State or National Leader in Environmental
Regulation?: An Analysis of California's Ban of Bromated Flame Retardants, 14 S. CAL. IN-
TERDISC. L.J. 345, 352 (2005).
128. Protecting Americans from Toxic Chemicals, PREEMPTION ALERT, Aug. 2006, at 3,
available at http://www.uspirg.org/html/preemptionalert/august06.pdf.
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act on chemicals added to the treaty after the United States completes
ratification.
1 29
C. Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms
of Discrimination against Women
1. Background
In 1946, the United Nations established the Commission on the
Status of Women. Subsequent efforts culminated in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which
applied the recent advances in the human rights field to "develop[] ap-
propriate human rights language for women.,', 3' The CEDAW obligates
states to use constitutional, legislative, and judicial measures to prohibit,
eliminate, and ameliorate all discrimination against women. 32 The
United States actively participated in the drafting of the CEDAW. 3 TO
date, 185 countries have ratified the treaty.1
34
Like most human rights treaties, the CEDAW uses transparency
mechanisms rather than enforcement provisions to facilitate compliance.
For instance, the convention requires countries to submit progress re-
ports every four years. 35 These reports focus on the legislative, judicial,
and administrative measures taken to comply with the CEDAW. The Op-
tional Protocol to the CEDAW, which has a much less substantial
membership than the CEDAW itself, allows individuals to file com-
plaints directly before an international committee that may issue a ruling
that binds the domestic courts of the individual's country.136
129. Lois R. Ember et al., Congressional Outlook 2006, 84 CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS 13,
18 (Jan. 23, 2006).
130. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Dec. 18, 1978, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
131. WORKING GROUP ON RATIFICATION OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINA-
TION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL 8 (2001),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/cedaw/cedawcolor.pdf [hereinafter CEDAW WORK-
ING GROUP]
132. CEDAW, supra note 130, art. 2.
133. See LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRIPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN (1993). United States involvement included pushing for language prohibiting "dis-
crimination based on sex" rather than the more narrow final language which focuses on
"discrimination against women," as well as temporary, rather than permanent, special stan-
dards to promote the equality of women. Id. at 55, 69.
134. U.N. Division for the Advancement for Women, CEDAW States Parties,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm.
135. CEDAW, supra note 130, arts. 18, 20.
136. Rina Jimenez-David, Downgrading Women, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Apr. 2, 2005, at
A13.
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The evidence on international compliance with the CEDAW is
mixed. Some signatories seem only nominally committed to the treaty.'37
Many countries have failed to meet their reporting requirements and they
rarely provide judicial or legislative remedies for individual violations."38
On the other hand, activists credit the CEDAW with discrete victories
such as the development of women's citizenship rights in Botswana and
Japan, inheritance rights in Tanzania, and property rights in Costa
Rica.'3 9 Similarly, the Brazilian and Ugandan constitutions draw directly
from CEDAW provisions.'
40
The United States, however, is a notable holdout. President Carter,
sparking optimism about the treaty's prospects, signed the CEDAW
shortly after it was opened for signature in 1980. Although Carter sub-
mitted the treaty for advice and consent that year, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee did not hold its first hearings until 1988.' 4' Years
later, President Clinton recommended ratification of the CEDAW with
reservations, understandings, and declarations on issues such as federal-
ism, women in combat, and paid maternity leave.' 42 But the Senate did
not act. Even if ratified, the CEDAW is not self-executing, and the treaty
expressly allows for any reservations, understandings, and declarations
that are not fundamentally incompatible with the treaty's purposes.
2. Sub-Federal Action
Numerous cities and states have urged federal ratification of the
CEDAW-nine states have passed ratification resolutions. 43 In 1998,
twenty years after President Carter signed the CEDAW, San Francisco
passed a local ordinance implementing its principles.'" The nonprofit
group promoting the ordinance wanted both to demonstrate the benefits
of CEDAW ratification and implementation to elected officials and to
137. For instance, Laos and Zaire have never submitted reports. See REHOF, supra note
133, at 359-61.
138. ANNE E BAYESKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT
THE CROSSROADS xiii (2001).
139. CEDAW WORKING GROUP, supra note 131, at 6.
140. Id. at 37.
141. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 956, 971-72 (2002).
142. See CEDAW: Treaty for the Rights of Women, http://www.womenstreaty.org/
facts history.htm (observing that the Senate held hearings again as recently as 2002, but has
not yet provided advice and consent).
143. See CEDAW WORKING GROUP, supra note 131, at 9; Harold Hongju Koh, Why
America Should Ratify the Women's Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 263,
274 (2002).
144. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12K (2001), available at http://www.municode.com/
Resources/gateway.asp?pid= 14131 &sid=5. It was later amended to reflect the principles of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Discrimination (a treaty that the U.S.
ratified, but has not implemented).
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"bring the weight of international human rights into our communities
and provide[] us with mechanisms to adopt international success strate-
gies and best practices here in the United States."
'4 5
San Francisco's local integration of the CEDAW focuses on data col-
lection. So far, San Francisco has completed CEDAW-mandated gender
analyses of six city departments using a "framework to evaluate and ad-
dress any differential impact of service delivery, employment practices,
and budget allocation.' 46 These analyses prompted the city to institute
changes in order to better allocate resources to female offenders in juve-
nile probation; increase and improve collection of gender-disaggregated
data; change placements of streetlights and sidewalk cuts; expand sexual
harassment training; improve flexibility in meeting vendor requirements
for women; and encourage appointments of women to revenue-creating
commissions. 47 While these changes may seem minimal given the scope
of the CEDAW's protections, San Francisco is already largely in compli-
ance with the CEDAW.
Influenced by San Francisco, other cities and states are promoting
similar initiatives. 48 Activists interested in starting CEDAW campaigns
hold workshops and public hearings and draft resolutions urging both
ratification and local implementation. 49 More developed campaigns
promote specific policy changes and the collection of disaggregated data.
For instance, a research coalition in Massachusetts is pushing for a re-
view of state laws and regulations in order to determine their compliance
with the CEDAW,150 educating legislators on the value of CEDAW ratifi-
145. See Lozner, supra note 6, at 778 n.53.
146. Human Rights GOAL: Hearing Before the Government Operations Committee, New
York City Council (Apr. 8, 2005) (statement of Emily M. Murase, Executive Director of the
San Francisco Department on the Status of Women), available at http://nychri.org/docu-
ments/Murase.pdf.
147. Human Rights GOAL: Hearing Before the Government Operations Committee, New
York City Council (Apr. 8, 2005) (statement of Krishanti Dharmaraj of WILD for Human
Rights), available at http://nychri.org/documents/Dharmara.pdf.
148. Los Angeles has passed similar CEDAW ordinances. Efforts are also underway in
Chicago, Seattle, Palo Alto, Santa Cruz County, and Santa Clara. Legal Momentum, Izterna-
tional Treaties: State and Local Implementation of the Women's Convention, http://www.legal
momentum.org/legalmomentum/issues/intemationalhumanrights/2006/05/state and local-im
plementation.php.
149. See generally WOMEN'S INST. FOR LEADERSHIP DEV. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LOCAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DIS-
CRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (1999).
150. H.B. 706, Representative Story of Amherst Petition (Mass. 2005), http://www.mass.
gov/legis/bills/house/ht00/ht00706.htm.
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cation, and drafting model CEDAW resolutions and ordinances.'5 ' Chi-
cago, Los Angeles, and Atlanta have undertaken similar campaigns.'2
D. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination
1. Background
In the early 1960s, highly visible anti-Semitic events such as swas-
tika painting'5 3 and the horrors of apartheid 5 4 inspired the global
community to address racial discrimination comprehensively. The CERD
entered into force in 1969 and has since been ratified by 155 countries.' 5
The convention commits state parties to ending racial discrimination by:
(1) reviewing government policies that create or perpetuate discrimina-
tion; (2) prohibiting racial discrimination by persons, groups, or
organizations; and (3) undertaking "special and concrete measures to
ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial
groups."' 116 It also bans racial segregation and apartheid,'57 criminalizes
the dissemination of racist propaganda,'5 8 and encourages tolerance
measures in the fields of education, culture, and information. 
59
The United States enthusiastically participated in the CERD's draft-
ing'60 and quickly signed the completed treaty. In order to address
constitutional constraints, a statement precluding any domestic legisla-
tion inconsistent with constitutional guarantees such as the right to free
speech accompanied the U.S. signature.' 6' The Senate, however, did not
ratify the CERD until 1994. 62 Even then, the treaty was deemed non-
self-executing' 6' and Congress never enacted implementing legislation.
151. The Massachusetts CEDAW Project, http://www.suffolk.edu/research/6727.html.
152. Women's Inst. for Leadership Dev., CEDAW Around the U.S., http://www.wildfor-
humanrights.org/ourwork/cedawus.html.
153. Egon Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 996, 997 (1966).
154. LERNER, supra note 61, at 40-43.
155. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
156. Id. art. 2.
157. Id. art. 3.
158. Id. art. 4.
159. Id. art. 7.
160. LERNER, supra note 61, at 200.
161. United Nations Adopts Convention on Racial Discrimination, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL.
212 (1966).
162. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 103d Cong., 140 CONG. REC. S7634 (1994).
163. Id.
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2. Sub-Federal Action
Several states and localities have directly incorporated the CERD
into legislation and city ordinances. For example, in 1986, Burlington,
Iowa, incorporated some provisions of the CERD into Human Rights
Ordinance 2 80 7 .64 More controversially, in 2003, the Black Faculty As-
sociation used the CERD's definition of discrimination to draft a bill
defining preferential treatment under Article 31 of California's state con-
stitution as permissible.6 This bill, which became Section 8315, allowed
affirmative action in some contexts. Numerous parties brought legal
challenges against Section 8315 for violating the state constitution, and
in C & C Construction v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District,67 a
California appeals court determined that Section 8315 was an unconsti-
tutional amendment.
1 68
In a separate effort, New York City has recently debated legislation
designed to implement the CERD. 69 If passed, this legislation would
require city agencies to undertake data collection, analysis, and dissemi-
nation with the object of proactively addressing racial and gender
discrimination in all aspects of government, including employment, ser-
vice provision, contract work, and policing strategies. The legislative
proposal is premised on the notion that more and better data will demon-
strate evidence of widespread discrimination.'70
Although this Article focuses on a few discrete examples, further in-
stances of sub-federal integration are on the horizon. While it is beyond
the scope of this Article to suggest a theory as to which human rights and
environmental treaties are likely to be subject to sub-federal integration,
164. Burlington, Iowa, Ordinance 2807 (Sept. 2, 1986), reprinted in THOMAS M.
FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS 790 (2d ed. 1993).
165. APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., DEFINING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ASSEMBLY BILL 703,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2003 (n.d.), available at http://www.arc.org/pdf/162pdf.pdf.
166. See, e.g., Connerly v. Schwarzenegger, 146 Cal. App. 4th 739 (Ct. App. 2007).
167. 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715 (Ct. App. 2004). As procedural error prevented the court from
ruling on the argument that ratification made the definition binding on the states, in dicta the
court contended that "by adopting section 31 [proposition 209], the People have determined,
by implication that special measures are not only unnecessary to ensure human rights and
fundamental freedoms in California, but inimical to those principles." Id. at 727. In contrast, in
a prior case, in Avila v. Berkeley Unified School District, No. RG03-110397, 2004 WL
793295, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2004), an Alameda Superior Court held that a voluntary
school desegregation plan that used race as one factor in determining school assignment was
consistent with the definition of section 8315.
168. C & C Constr., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 727.
169. N.Y.C. Human Rights Initiative, Questions and Answers about the N.YC. Human
Rights Initiative (n.d.), http://nychri.org/documents/QANYCHRI.pdf.
170. Human Rights GOAL: Hearing Before the Government Operations Committee, New
York City Council (Apr. 8, 2005) (statement of Diana Salas, Researcher for Women of Color
Policy Network), available at http://nychri.org/documents/Salas.pdf.
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some obvious candidates stand out. Human rights treaties are extremely
visible to civil society and government actors. Moreover, of the seven
UN-based human rights treaties, the United States has signed but not
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),' 7' the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 7 2 and the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Family. In particular, the CRC is ripe for
state implementation, as state law governs the bulk of the treaty provi-
sions.' 73 Preliminary evidence suggests the beginning of just such a
strategy. 7 Other countries with federalist governance structures may
also engage in similar behavior.
E. Assessing Sub-Federal Integration Through Compliance Theory
Both rational choice and norm-based theories provide valuable in-
sights about sub-federal integration, but neither provides a full account
of existing practices. Rational choice has little to say about why sub-
federal actors choose to integrate treaties. Perhaps cities and states have
run cost-benefit analyses and determined greenhouse gas reductions
were in their interests, despite prevailing beliefs at the federal level that
the Kyoto Protocol is contrary to the national interest. Yet rational choice
struggles to explain why cities and states invoke the Kyoto Protocol in
order to reduce greenhouse gases. Similarly, rational choice adequately
identifies the limitations of sub-federal integration of human rights trea-
ties, but it lacks explanatory force as to why sub-federal entities chose
these human rights projects or their degree of ongoing compliance. Ra-
tional choice would probably rightly predict that sub-federal integration
is unlikely in places that reject identification with the international
community-San Francisco, Berkeley, and New York are more likely
candidates than Topeka, Peoria, or Jackson. Even so, rational choice
might not predict the practice of sub-federal integration at all. Cities and
states choose among various mechanisms for helping their citizens, and
171. The United States, however, has ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution
and child pornography.
172. G.A. Res. 2200, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Dec. 16, 1966).
173. For instance, both juvenile justice and family law are clearly in the states' province.
Notable exceptions include the prohibition on recruiting persons before they turn eighteen and
arguably, the right to life.
174. For instance, the "expansion of child specific refugee determination" was influ-
enced by the invocation of the CRC. Jacqueline Bhabha, More than Their Share of Sorrows:
International Migration Law and the Rights of Children, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 253,
269 (2003).
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rational choice does not provide a basis for understanding why cities and
states would find treaties particularly useful.
In contrast, many aspects of the norm-based theories, particularly the
managerial school, help make sense of the ways in which sub-federal
actors implement treaty law. The managerial school emphasizes the im-
portance of data collection to determine state performance and
encourage conversation about improved future compliance. The manage-
rial school also focuses on the importance of the treaty regime in
developing domestic capacity. While states and localities receive no for-
eign funds to accomplish the treaty's goals, they can learn from treaty
members through training, research, and education. More broadly, the
managerial school relies on the use of argument and persuasion to influ-
ence state behavior, and it would therefore predict that sub-federal actors
would use other countries' experiences under the treaty as evidence of
the possibility and the benefits of compliance.1
75
While many sub-federal initiatives are in their preliminary stages,
their current level of development suggests the possibility of extending
treaty regime management to nonratifying sub-federal units. In other
words, many of the mechanisms thought by norm-based theorists to be
essential to encouraging the compliance of treaty parties can and are be-
ing extended to nonratifying sub-federal actors. For instance, the
emphasis in compliance theory on data collection and self-reporting
strongly informs sub-federal practices in this area. Both the ICLEI and
the RGGI utilize information sharing to distill best practices. Many
mayors plan to attend the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework on
Climate Change, during which state parties will be discussing how to
improve Kyoto Protocol compliance. 76 The mayors can garner some of
the benefits of those countries' experiences even though they cannot
formally join the treaty. Similarly, those implementing the San Francisco
CEDAW and promoting the New York CERD view information gather-
ing as the foundation for other policy changes. All four programs
presume that governmental and private actors want to provide the re-
quested data, and none of these sub-federal initiatives relies on sanctions
or other punitive enforcement mechanisms.
As expected under the managerial theory, many of the sub-federal
initiatives contemplate national and international cooperation to help
175. Often treaty frameworks result in an accompanying body of case law interpreting
the language. This occurs both through the treaty's committee that evaluates the state's inter-
pretations in addition to the variety of domestic courts in different countries that will interpret
the treaty. While a nonratifiying sub-federal unit would not be bound, this case law provides
valuable guidance and insight to help resolve ambiguities and difficult cases.
176. Seattle Office of the Mayor, International Talks on Global Warming FAQ (2005),
http://www.seattle.gov/mayor/climate/pdf/MontrealFAQ.pdf.
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build compliance capacity. The climate initiatives draw on international
experiences in implementing the Kyoto Protocol to help design and im-
plement the permitting schemes. The San Francisco CEDAW has
emulated countries with legislative experience implementing particular
treaty provisions. In turn, San Francisco shares its experiences with other
state and city CEDAW projects.
If the managerial theory's focus on capacity building to foster com-
pliance and data collection to identify otherwise invisible problems is
correct, it provides a reason to be optimistic about compliance with the
New York CERD initiative and a corresponding reason to be pessimistic
about compliance with the California CERD initiative. The New York
CERD relies on data collection and networks of human rights advocates.
CERD advocates actively draw from the experiences of the San Fran-
cisco CEDAW. By contrast, the California CERD implemented
international human rights principles without linking them to any trans-
national networks, requesting treaty management resources, or drawing
on national efforts to implement the CEDAW or the CERD, and it thus
seems less likely to succeed.
All the sub-federal initiatives rely on the underlying treaties as a
framework in which to conceptualize and understand rights and obliga-
tions. The climate initiatives rely on the cause and effect relationships
well articulated first in the UN Framework on Climate Change and later
in the Kyoto Protocol. Similarly, advocates suggest the human rights
paradigm presents a framework different from existing U.S. legal ap-
proaches in that it "recognize[s] the interconnectedness of rights,"
"account[s] for unintentional [discriminatory] impacts," and obligates
the government to take gradual and progressive steps to address inequal-
ity, whether caused by governmental or private actors.' The New York
CERD information-gathering scheme also reflects the human rights
methodology of "promoting change by reporting facts."' 78 The arguments
in favor of this bill advocate shifting from a litigation-based, civil rights
framework to a human rights-based, proactive legislation framework.'79
In sum, the case studies suggest the salience of the managerial
school's insights about data collection and cooperation. While the case
studies do not help predict which principles and ideas will ultimately
succeed at refraining domestic debates, they do demonstrate the viability
of using treaties as frames. Norm entrepreneurs can use treaties to extend
177. Human Rights for All: Hearing on H.B. 706 Before the J. Judiciary Comm., 184th
Sess. (Mass. 2005) (statement of Martha F. Davis, Professor of Law, Northeastern University
School of Law), http://www.suffolk.edu/files/cwhhr/davis.pdf.
178. Dorothy Q. Thomas, Holding Governments Accountable by Public Pressure in
OURS BY RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS 82, 83 (Joanna Kerr ed., 1993).
179. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Human Rights Initiative, supra note 169.
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these mechanisms informally to nonmembers. The implementation of
sub-federal efforts also demonstrates that cities and states can use power-
ful underlying treaty norms and ideas to bypass federal unwillingness to
internalize international rules.'80
In addition to utilizing treaties as new frameworks to approach a
substantive problem, all four case studies provide some support for the
notion that sub-federal integration of treaties reduces drafting costs and
enhances learning opportunities for sub-federal units. Both the RGGI
and the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement draw from treaty lan-
guage and look at implementing legislation in other countries. Domestic
CEDAW advocates worked with NGOs and states involved in interna-
tional CEDAW implementation to help develop San Francisco's
legislation. New York's CERD draft legislation uses a combination of
San Francisco's language and CERD language from abroad. The Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement self-consciously uses the Kyoto Protocol
as a focal point for measuring compliance. This action facilitates com-
parisons to international initiatives and a more seamless integration into
the Kyoto tradable permit regime. For instance, the RGGI intends to al-
low offsets to include EU Emission Trading allowances and Clean
Development Mechanism credits.' 2 Using the same baseline reductions
makes integration of those allowances and credits easier.
Finally, the case studies also demonstrate the use of an international
consensus as a means for actively pursuing a cosmopolitan identity. The
Mayors Climate Protection Agreement uses the Inter-Governmental
Panel on Climate Change as evidence of international consensus on the
existence of a warming problem and the U.S. absence from the Kyoto
Protocol as the impetus for city action. 8 1 Yet crafting a sub-federal initia-
tive as a cosmopolitan policy can cut in both directions. The policy
integrating the CERD into California's state constitutional interpretation
drew fire as an unwarranted international intrusion into the domestic
180. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 500 (adding to the argument that one only need to look
to treaty terms and domestic institutions to make predictions about the internalization of inter-
national rules).
181. Seattle Office of the Mayor, What is the US Mayors Climate Protection Agree-
ment?, http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/mayor/climate/ (declaring that participating cities commit
to "strive to meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol targets" and urging other governmental actors to
"meet or beat the greenhouse gas emission reduction target suggested for the United States in
the Kyoto Protocol.").
182. Memorandum from the Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) Staff Working
Group to RGGI Agency Heads, Revised Staff Working Groups Proposal (Aug. 24, 2005),
http://rggi.org/docs/rggi-proposal-8 -24 -05.pdf.
183. U.S. Conference of Mayors, Endorsing the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection
Agreement (June 13, 2005), http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/mayor/climate/PDF/Resolution-
FinalLanguage_06-13-05.pdf.
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process. Similarly, some resistance to RGGI as an international policy
has emerged. In 2003, Representative Joy introduced a bill in the Maine
legislature to prohibit "[a] state department or agency [from] ex-
pend[ing] or award[ing] funds to implement, in whole or in part, an
international treaty that the United States Senate has not ratified."'85
IV. COMPARING SUB-FEDERAL INTEGRATION AND RATIFICATION
Although sub-federal actors cannot ratify treaties nor participate in
their negotiation, they can integrate treaty law into domestic law by ex-
pressing support for ratification or implementing the treaty's substantive
provisions. Yet such integration does not perfectly mirror the federal rati-
fication and implementation process. This Part describes how sub-federal
integration fails to capture many of the benefits-and avoids some of the
burdens-associated with treaty ratification and membership. This Part
also contests the prediction that sub-federal integration itself will spark
treaty ratification. Rather, while the existence of a treaty can help shape
local preferences and change local practices through sub-federal integra-
tion, this Article suggests that such integration is unlikely to change
federal practice with regard to ratification.
A. Distinguishing Treaty Ratification and Sub-Federal Integration
1. Benefits
Treaty membership provides benefits to a country at both the inter-
national and domestic levels. These benefits include reputational gains,
influence over the treaty's governance structure, realignment of govern-
mental powers, and interest maximization. First, one potential
international benefit is the ability to develop or strengthen a reputation
for international compliance. For countries trying to establish themselves
as good neighbors in the global community, joining a treaty may provide
such a signal, which may be bolstered by remaining a member in good
standing. Empirical evidence suggests the importance of this signal to
184. The complaint argued, "[r]ather than interpreting constitutional terms according to
the intent of the voters, Government Code section 8315 provides statutory definitions accord-
ing to an international treaty that has nothing to do with the law of this state or voter intent in
adopting the constitutional amendment." Complaint at 7, Connerly v. Davis, No. 03AS05154
(Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2005).
185. Paul J. Georgia, Maine Bill Would Prevent Kyoto Implementation, COOLER HEADS
NEWSL. (Competitve Enter. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 21, 2003, available at http://www.
cei.org/gencon/014,03365.cfm. The Bill was voted "ought not pass" and thus has died. State
of Maine Legislature, Summary of LD 317, http://janus.state.me.usllegis/
LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?LD=317&SessionlD=5.
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new states and those that have recently experienced a dramatic change in
governance.8 6 For example, a country like Cambodia might benefit from
ratifying a regional or international human rights treaty by signaling its
desire to be an active part of the international community and suggesting
it is a stable place for future investment. For countries already seen as
good neighbors, treaty membership might be necessary to exercise issue-
specific leadership. For example, the transnational legal process school
suggests the United States cannot lead on human rights and environ-
mental issues while it stays outside relevant treaties.'87
Rational choice scholars, however, persuasively dispute the signifi-
cance of such reputational gains. They argue that if a powerful country
like the United States wants to lead on a given issue, it can do so through
increased funding, tied aid, or economic sanctions. So, for example, al-
though the United States stayed outside the Landmine Ban Treaty, it
exercised issue leadership in the area through massive increases in
demining funding. In addition, countries often maintain multiple repu-
tations in discrete issue areas, so breaching or refusing to join one treaty
may have no influence on their reputation for an unrelated treaty. Rather,
the best metric to gauge a country's reliability is its treaty behavior in
similar issue areas.' 9 For instance, in order to determine the likelihood
that Cambodia will abide by an environmental agreement, countries
should look to its participation in other environmental treaties, rather
than its ratification of human rights treaties. More relevantly, according
to rational choice theorists, the power of the United States and its mem-
bership in other treaties render the possible reputational gains from
individual treaty membership quite small.
Countries may also benefit from participation in a treaty's govern-
ance structure.' 90 Membership means some involvement in the future
interpretation of the treaty language and the adjudication of treaty-
related disputes. Treaty parties determine how to spend the regime's
186. See Downs & Jones, supra note 20, at S 108.
187. See CEDAW WORKING GROUP, supra note 131, at 7 ("As long as it remains one of
the few nations that have failed to ratify CEDAW, the United States compromises its credibil-
ity as a world leader in human rights.").
188. Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses,
and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty,
20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 561, 600 (2003).
189. Downs & Jones, supra note 20, at S97.
190. For instance, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson urged the U.S. to ratify the
Stockholm Convention, as "only by ratifying the Stockholm Convention could the United
States ensure its economic, environmental and public health interests are represented this fall,
when treaty parties are set to consider new POP listings, regulation of asbestos and nominees
for expert scientific panels." Lauren Morello, Chemicals: Second House POPS Bill Sent to the
Floor, ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY, July 28, 2006.
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political and fiscal resources.' 9' For treaty regimes with sanctioning pow-
ers, members determine when and how to deploy those measures. Treaty
members also reap the diplomatic benefits of repeated interactions over
time and have access to information that may not be released to non-
members. Finally, treaty membership may be a prerequisite for some
other desired benefit such as foreign assistance or membership in a dif-
ferent organization.
Yet these benefits may seem rather minor to a country like the
United States. As discussed above, the United States often has great in-
fluence on the original treaty structure and substance. Even if its refusal
to join prevents it from exercising inside influence as the treaty goes
forward, it may still attempt to persuade individual treaty members
through other means. Nor need the United States worry about member-
ships in other treaties or the availability of financial assistance-it is
generally in the position of linking benefits or blocking access to treaties
for less developed countries.
At the domestic level, treaties can provide a variety of other benefits.
Conventional wisdom holds that countries join treaties because the cost
of compliance is lower than the expected gains. While any country may
have individual losers, presumably the winners will win more than the
losers will lose. At the very least, the treaty regime likely satisfies the
country's preferences to a greater degree than remaining outside the
treaty. '92 Subsets of government actors may also gain from joining a
treaty, as some treaties shift decisionmaking away from one branch of
government to another or from one level of government to another. For
example, in the United States, treaties may allow the executive branch to
make decisions normally left to the Congress, although advice and con-
sent guarantees that Congress still has some influence.' 93
Countries might also join treaties that are internationally welfare-
enhancing even though their constituents will be net losers. In such
cases, institutions in wealthy countries could perceive themselves as
bearing cosmopolitan duties to benefit people and countries outside their
own communities even if it is contrary to the material national interest.'94
For instance, many may believe the United States should join the Kyoto
Protocol even if most benefits would accrue to poor and less developed
191. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 131-34.
192. See GRUBER, supra note 58.
193. Similarly, binding enforcement mechanisms may shift power from one branch to
another. For instance, the presence of binding dispute mechanisms in the WTO may maximize
executive power at the expense of legislative power. See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute
Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REv. 251 (2006).
194. See Nussbaum, supra note 68, at 13-14, 133 (discussing moral obligations to the
world community as a relevant constraint on personal and political decisionmaking).
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countries, because these countries would gain more than the United
States would lose.1
95
Sub-federal integration without ratification likely garners none of
these national benefits. It reflects local, rather than national preferences,
and other countries may be unlikely to take note of sub-federal policies.
As increasing numbers of cities and states coordinate their efforts, sub-
federal integration may draw some international attention, but even then,
other countries seem unlikely to perceive these actions as reliable indica-
tors of future federal policy. Thus, sub-federal integration cannot restore
national issue-specific leadership. 196 Similarly, sub-federal agents cannot
realize many of the treaty membership benefits, as only federal actors
are allowed to participate in the treaty governance regime. Individual
cities and states cannot directly influence treaty interpretation or serve
on treaty regime bodies. They cannot vote on substantive or procedural
components of the treaty or provide judges to an adjudicative body, nor
are they eligible to receive resource transfers under the treaty.
Sub-federal units can, however, capture many of the domestic treaty
benefits. In particular, the main benefits of human rights treaties accrue
to the individuals and societies affected by domestic change regardless
of whether other countries participate. For example, the benefit from
addressing sex discrimination flows to individuals and the society in
which those individuals live, regardless of whether other countries also
comply with their treaty obligations. So the San Francisco CEDAW pro-
duces concrete benefits for women, such as more streetlamps and
policies adapted to gender-disaggregated data, even if the international
treaty regime is poorly implemented, or not implemented at all, else-
where.
Measuring the domestic benefits of environmental treaties is more
complicated. Treaty members often need high levels of international
compliance to receive significant benefits. Even so, compliance by a sin-
gle country often results in some benefit, regardless of whether other
countries comply. For example, if the United States reduced greenhouse
gas emissions in order to comply with its hypothetical Kyoto Protocol
obligations, net global emissions would still be reduced and the problem
the Protocol seeks to address would be partially ameliorated, regardless
of whether European and Asian countries also comply with their
195. Rational choice scholars are skeptical that countries are capable of acting in a cos-
mopolitan manner, since most societies "[do] not consist of self-selected members with
relatively homogenous and intense cosmopolitan sentiments." Goldsmith, supra note 69, at
1676.
196. Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters: Non-State Actors, Treaties, and
the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 150 (2005) (noting
the unavailability of information about most sub-federal agreements).
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obligations.'97 Similarly, if multiple states band together to implement
their own greenhouse emissions scheme, they will also reduce net emis-
sions. Environmental treaties pose additional complexity in that a
compliant actor does not necessarily benefit commensurately with its
obligations. For instance, holding unintended consequences constant,
while all countries receive an absolute gain from a reduction in green-
house emissions, an individual country that reduces emissions may
receive less of a relative gain than another country that does nothing. No
country can fully internalize all the benefits of its reduced emissions.
Sub-federal units that share policy preferences with ratifying coun-
tries can also benefit on an administrative level from implementing
legislation similar to that of the ratifying countries. This mimicry allows
sub-federal units to reduce their legislative drafting costs and learn from
the experiences of other states. For individual cities, the ability to copy
legislation on a complex human rights or environmental problem rather
than draft its own may save significant resources. In addition, the treaty
provides a framework from which to sell the legislation to the public.
Rather than forcing each city and state to come up with a comprehensive
rhetorical and policy package to describe the desired changes, it can rely
on the hard work of drafting countries and NGOs in formulating a treaty.
The treaty text also provides focal points and uniform benchmarks
against which to measure the success of the implementation of the legis-
lation. Cities and states can easily compare their gains both domestically
and internationally when they share treaty measurements.
2. Costs and Burdens
While sub-federal integration forgoes many of the international
gains of federal ratification, it may also avoid the costs of joining multi-
lateral treaty regimes. First, many multilateral human rights and
environmental treaties create potentially problematic governance struc-
tures. Rather than encouraging individual countries to determine for
themselves what the language of the treaty means and what constitutes a
violation, many treaties delegate that authority to a supranational body.98
In many instances, the U.S. government and individual states and cities
may prefer to interpret the language for themselves. Sub-federal imple-
mentation also preserves sovereignty by allowing total domestic control
over future administrative decisions and resource allocation. As a major
power, the United States wields much influence in international organi-
197. Another country could decide to increase its emissions in relation to compliant
states' reductions, but the incentives do not seem to work in that direction.
198. See Laurence R. Heifer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
285, 298-301 (1999).
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zations, but coalitions and voting rules may thwart its desired outcomes.
Sub-federal integration can also better serve the related democratic con-
cern of transparency, as the decisionmaking of some treaty bodies is
inaccessible and opaque.'"
In addition, wealthy countries often bear the brunt of financing these
governance structures. While the United States has occasionally avoided
some of these costs by refusing to pay its UN dues, ° most administra-
tions feel compelled to pay for those structures in which they participate.
At the very least, the United States incurs the diplomatic costs of free
riding when it chooses not to contribute to treaty governance structures.
Similarly, environmental treaties sometimes obligate wealthy countries
to subsidize technology and other transfers to less wealthy states to fa-
cilitate compliance.' For those who support the underlying policy, such
transfer of resources may be unobjectionable, but staying outside the
treaty gives the United States the flexibility to make a case-by-case de-
termination of whether and how it transfers resources. The United States
may prefer to reward allies with such transfers or condition aid on unre-
lated goals. Similarly, the absence of a supranational structure may allow
for greater flexibility and speed of implementation because sub-federal
actors would be guided, but not bound, by the treaty's structures.
The costs of reversing course are also higher for those parties bound
by a treaty. Most treaties have a defined waiting period for withdrawal, if
they allow it at all202 whereas sub-federal policies can be repealed
through normal legislative means. In theory, the United States could ig-
nore a treaty's limitations on withdrawal, but in practice it generally
abides by the exit language.0 3 Moreover, treaty withdrawal seems likely
to engender a greater degree of international hostility than changes in
domestic policy, even if both changes were directed at the same underly-
ing policy shift.
In sum, treaty ratification facilitates international reputational bene-
fits along with diplomatic and other benefits from participation in the
treaty regime. Yet treaty ratification also risks participation in a regime
that deviates from national interests and can commit the state to un-
wanted resource expenditures. Sub-federal integration can capture many
199. See generally THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN? GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND
THE ASYMMETRY OF POWER (Daniel Drache ed., 1991).
200. For instance, the United States once owed one billion dollars in assessed dues.
Washington Publicly Chastised for Reneging on U.N. Payments, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 28,
1995, at A23.
201. See William Onzivu, International Environmental Law, the Public Health, and
Domestic Environmental Governance in Developing Countries, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 597,
636 (2006).
202. See Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REv. 1579 (2005).
203. Id.
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of the domestic benefits of integrating the treaty's substantive norms, but
it forgoes the benefits and burdens of treaty membership itself.
B. Will Sub-Federal Integration Influence Federal Ratification?
The transnational legal process school suggests legal norm internali-
zation will "set[] the stage for eventual ratification of these treaties by
the abstaining nations on the ground that de facto internalization has al-
ready become a fait accompli.''2°4  Relatedly, by acting as the
"laboratories of democracy," sub-federal units may demonstrate the
benefits of the treaty's policy preferences and underlying norms. For ex-
ample, Catherine Powell urges the national government to act as a
clearinghouse for the coordination of sub-federal efforts to integrate in-
ternational law and distill these efforts into best practices.205 Powell
suggests that such national involvement would facilitate a norm cascade
in favor of treaty ratification. 26 Similarly, other norm theorists might hy-
pothesize that sub-federal integration would direct positive attention to
the treaty, help reframe the policy debate, demonstrate popular support,
and generally strengthen the forces urging ratification.
This Article, however, suggests numerous reasons to be hesitant
about the prospect that sub-federal integration will hasten federal treaty
ratification. Admittedly, successful sub-federal integration provides evi-
dence of the domestic benefits of treaty implementation. For instance,
San Francisco's CEDAW ordinance may persuade the federal govern-
ment of the need for national legislation to address the treatment of
women, and it may demonstrate the effectiveness of such legislation. Yet
such evidence may not convince domestic constituents to help provide
those benefits internationally-much empirical evidence suggests altru-
ism declines as the beneficiaries become more distant in location and
cultural affiliation.0 7 Even cosmopolitan cities and states feel substan-
tially greater attachment to their own citizens than to the abstract global
community.28 In addition, sub-federal integration fails to shed any light
on the costs and benefits of joining the treaty regime itself. As discussed
204. Koh, supra note 28, at 679 (1998).
205. Powell, supra note 6, at 273 (contending that "co-opetition" between sub-federal
agents and the federal government will provide states incentive to ratchet their standards up-
ward through cooperative pressures).
206. Powell overstates the necessity of national involvement in sub-federal integration.
In a brief paragraph, Powell acknowledges that national, state, and local networks could fill in
when the federal government was unwilling. Id. at 271-72. Rather than waiting for federal
coordination, states have already developed their own mechanisms to share information. The
federal government does not seem to possess unique expertise in determining or distilling best
practices. For instance, states often draft model legislation.
207. See Goldsmith, supra note 69, at 1677.
208. Nussbaum, supra note 68, at 13.
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above, the United States may be wary of binding dispute resolution, un-
anticipated regime developments, and the influence of other countries on
the interpretation of state duties and burdens. Finally, successful sub-
federal integration may simply convince the federal government that
domestic experimentation is best, and that it can capture the treaty's sub-
stantive benefits without imposing the burdens of treaty membership.
Similarly, Powell's contention that the federal government's role as a
clearinghouse will increase the chances of federal treaty ratification ig-
nores a significant political will problem. Although federal coordination
might promote national norm internalization, a government hostile to a
treaty seems unlikely to muster the political will to coordinate state ef-
forts to promote the treaty. While the project for ratification and the
project for domestic integration are theoretically separable, the political
linkage of the two projects for most sub-federal integration suggests that
the federal government would shy away from supporting such efforts.
For example, the federal government seems profoundly unlikely to coor-
dinate best practices and support efforts to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,
since the Senate has already forbidden the spending of federal money on
Kyoto compliance2'9
Finally, the potential for a norm cascade may be more limited than
treaty supporters acknowledge. While empirical evidence suggests some
tentative enthusiasm for sub-federal integration's potential to snowball,
the spread of human rights legislation has generally been limited to cos-
mopolitan areas-liberal cities such as San Francisco and New York, or
college towns like Amherst and Berkeley. This quick but limited spread
of legislation is reminiscent of the nuclear weapons-free zones, which
garnered much support in places like Tacoma Park and Berkeley, but not
Peoria, Illinois, or Tyler, Texas. National oversight seems unlikely to
make a human rights framework more salient in those parts of America
actively hostile to or simply apathetic towards cosmopolitanism.
Sub-federal integration of environmental treaties, however, may be
more expansive. For instance, many of the cities supporting the Kyoto
Protocol, such as Macon, Georgia, are not traditionally liberal.. The
states taking part in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative are also po-
litically, demographically, and economically diverse. The RGGI is not
actively promoting federal ratification, but environmental issues (espe-
cially when framed in terms of self-interest) may sometimes be more
bipartisan than human rights issues.
209. See supra Section III.A.
210. See Seattle Office of the Mayor, US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement,
http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/mayor/climate/default.htm#who.
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Thus far, limited empirical evidence suggests ratification does not
quickly follow sub-federal implementation. Despite early efforts, no real
progress has been made on the CEDAW's or the Kyoto Protocol's ratifi-
cation, nor on the CERD's implementing legislation. The Stockholm
Convention has only a slightly better chance of short-term ratification.
Still, it may be too early to discount entirely the possibility that these
initiatives will trigger a norm cascade in support of treaty ratification.
Even if sub-federal integration increases domestic support for ratifi-
cation over time, passage of multilateral human rights and environmental
treaties in the United States presents an institutional difficulty. Some
scholars suggest that a unique American rights culture keeps the United
States out of treaty regimes." ' These scholars contend that Americans are
reluctant to override existing constitutional understandings and protec-
tions by subordinating them to treaties. Other scholars point to a
combination of relative geopolitical strength, stable domestic institu-
tions, "the extreme conservativism of a vocal minority in the political
system," and "the extreme decentralization of [the United States'] politi-
212
cal institutions" in explaining U.S. reluctance to join some treaties.
Either way, as an empirical matter, the Senate ratifies few multilateral
human rights treaties, even when they have significant domestic sup-
port.1 3 Multilateral environmental treaties fare only slightly better.14
Numerous procedural hurdles also block many treaties. 2 First, the
Senate may only ratify treaties the executive branch chooses to submit.
Once submitted, Senate rules allow the head of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to prevent the treaty from ever reaching the floor by
216establishing the committee's agenda. Even if the treaty escapes the
committee, a single senator may still anonymously block the bill, or a
group of senators may filibuster the treaty. Once the treaty reaches the
full Senate, the two-thirds requirement for passing treaties often proves
substantially more difficult to overcome than the majority requirement
for passing domestic legislation. Thus, even treaties with widespread
public support may not be ratified.27
211. Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN Ex-
CEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147, 152-54 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (discussing
other scholars' views).
212. Id. at 196-97.
213. See supra Introduction.
214. Moravcsik, supra note 211, at 184-86.
215. See Edith Weiss, President's Message, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. NEWSL., Jan. 1996.
216. David Auerswald & Forrest Maltzman, Policymaking through Advice and Consent:
Treaty Consideration by the United States Senate, 65 J. POL. 1097, 1102 (2003).
217. Moravcsik, supra note 211, at 188.
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In addition to the ratification vote, most treaties are subject to a host
of reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs).2 8 RUDs in-
clude substantive objections, interpretive issues, federalism concerns,
preclusion of the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction, and decla-
rations that treaties are non-self-executing. In the case of human rights,
RUDs work not only to prevent the treaty from weakening existing
rights, but often also to preclude requirements that are more rigorous
than preexisting law.29 Moreover, the Senate generally designates these
treaties as non-self-executing,220 which leaves citizens unable to invoke
the treaty as a binding obligation in domestic courts.22' Similarly, mere
treaty ratification does not ensure the United States' consent to allowing
individual complaints to be heard by treaty adjudicative bodies.
Thus, while sub-federal integration may trigger a norm cascade in
like-minded states and cities to adopt similar propositions, it seems
unlikely to spur treaty ratification. Sub-federal integration lacks a com-
pelling mechanism for demonstrating the benefits of the treaty regime
itself as distinguished from the benefits of sub-federal implementation.
Even with widespread support, the institutional hurdles to ratification are
22very difficult to overcome.
In sum, the focus on ratification overestimates the benefits of treaty
membership in a country where doctrines of non-self-execution and
RUDs substantially limit the treaty's domestic impact. The focus on rati-
fication also overlooks the possibility of adopting national legislation
embodying the treaty norm without ratifying the treaty.223
V. LIMITS ON STATE AND LOCAL POWER
This Part briefly investigates constitutional constraints on the scope
and breadth of sub-federal integration in the United States. For instance,
the Constitution restricts the authority of states to conclude treaties or
218. See Edward Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307 (2006).
219. Roth, supra note 43, at 347. In fairness, sometimes these are one and the same. The
United States precludes a greater obligation on one front in order to protect rights in a differ-
ent front-for example, speech protections. On the other hand, something like a prohibition on
the federal death penalty is not inconsistent with existing constitutional protections; it just is
not compelled by them.
220. Cf id. at 348-49; Joel B. Eisen, From Stockholm to Kyoto and Back to the United
States: International Environmental Law's Effect on Domestic Law, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1435,
1451 (1999). But see David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-
Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129 (1999).
221. Roth, supra note 43, at 349.
222. This Section has focused on the United States.
223. For instance, the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement calls for national legisla-
tion apart from Kyoto ratification and implementation. See supra Section II.A.2.
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agreements with other powers. Sub-federal integration also implicates a
longstanding foreign relations debate concerning sub-federal actors criti-
cizing or seeking concessions from foreign governments. This debate
pits revisionists, who prefer to allow state action unless the federal gov-
ernment expressly acts in the area and enunciates a clear national
pocy,24 against one-voice nationalists, who believe all matters with a
direct impact on foreign relations are reserved for the federal govern-
ment. 225 This Part attempts to expand this debate by investigating
instances in which sub-federal integration either implicitly or explicitly
criticizes a domestic treaty position.
A. Textual Limitations
The Constitution explicitly contemplates a division of powers in for-
eign affairs. Article I, Section 10 dictates that "[no] State shall enter into
any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation ... No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power." In 1837, Justice Taney suggested
in Holmes v. Jennison that states could not make any arrangement with
foreign powers that includes those subjects that "had usually been made
subjects of negotiation and treaty. 2 26 States were allowed, however, to
make agreements or compacts with other states involving boundary set-
tlements and attendant regulatory issues even without express
congressional consent. Over time, the Compact Clause has been nar-
228rowed to "inherently political" agreements and compacts. In other
words, states only need congressional approval for arrangements that
221increase a state's political power or encroach on the nation's power.
224. See Curtis A. Bradley, World War 11 Compensation and Foreign Relations Federal-
ism, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 282 (2002) (discussing some of the limitations of one-voice
nationalism).
225. See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. State Rights in
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1277 (1999); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the
Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98
MicH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
226. 39 U.S. 540, 569 (1840) (holding that states lack the power to conclude either a
formal written treaty or negotiations with a foreign state to extradite a fugitive from justice).
227. Abraham C. Weinfeld, Comment, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitu-
tion Mean by "Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 464 (1936). See also
Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N.H. 200 (1845) (upholding the concurrent legislation of two
states creating a contract to build a bridge over a navigable river despite the lack of congres-
sional consent).
228. This distinction comes from Union Branch Rail Road Co. v. East Tennessee &
Georgia Railroad Co., 14 Ga. 327, 339-41 (1853).
229. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-442 (1981); Andrew A. Bruce, The Com-
pacts and Agreements of States with One Another and with Foreign Powers, 2 MINN. L. REV.
500, 514 (1918).
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The Treaty Clause and the Compact Clause impose real limits on the
sub-federal integration of treaty law. Any sub-federal legislation that in-
volves negotiations, bargaining, or contracts with other sub-federal or
foreign governments may require congressional and executive approval.
Thus, sub-federal actors and foreign governments cannot bypass the U.S.
government if they seek to create binding commitments. States, and by
extension cities, must find some other way to signal their intent to be
bound for agreements with foreign countries. For instance, they can draft
model, nonbinding legislation that can serve as a template for legislation
across sub-federal jurisdictions. They can also use memoranda of under-
standing and other nonbinding pacts to signal their intentions. The
RGGI's structure may reflect a concern about the Treaty and Compact
Clauses in this respect. Rather than using an interstate compact, the gov-
ernors signed a "memorandum of understanding in which each state will
agree to adopt regulations spelled out in the complex regional trading
scheme. 23° Similarly, under the RGGI, representatives from various Ca-
nadian provinces observed the process, but they undertook no binding
2311
obligations.
The Treaty Clause also precludes sub-federal actors from joining a
multilateral treaty regime or participating in its governance. These limits
probably matter more for environmental agreements, which involve
shared resources, while many human rights agreements govern seem-
ingly purely internal matters. A given state may be free to reduce
greenhouse gases through a permit scheme, but it has no influence over
the details of the international permit scheme as developed through the
Kyoto Protocol. If the state wants to interact with the Kyoto framework
by selling permits to European entities, the contract for the sale of per-
mits may pose a constitutional question. As these sub-federal efforts
grow increasingly sophisticated and wide ranging, groups may pursue
litigation to resolve some of these questions.
B. Preemption and Dormant Powers
In addition to the Constitution's textual limits on sub-federal action,
the federal government retains the power to preempt sub-federal initia-
tives. Courts have recognized the following varieties of preemption: (1)
express preemption, in which a federal statute clearly expresses the de-
sire of Congress to exclude state activity; (2) obstacle preemption, in
which a state statute stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
230. Margaret Kriz, Warm-Up Drills, 37 NAT'L J. 906, 909 (1995).
231. Reg'I Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 98. New England governors and East-
ern Canadian premiers had already issued a climate change action plan in August 2001. The
RGGI is designed to help these states meet the goals designated in the action plan. Id.
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purposes and objectives of a federal statute; (3) conflict preemption, in
which a state statute makes it impossible to comply with federal law; and
(4) field preemption, in which the federal government has acted so
definitively in a field that there is "no room for the states to supplement
it," or the federal interest in controlling the subject is strong enough to
presume federal law precludes state action.232 Thus, Congress may pass a
statute to preempt a particular act of sub-federal integration or it may
rely on courts to enforce its preferences. That being said, preemption
case law is very complex and the permissible limits of state action are
quite murky.
As this issue has been discussed at great length elsewhere,233 this Part
only briefly touches on a few relevant cases. In Crosby v. National For-
eign Trade Council, a recent statutory preemption case, the Supreme
Court struck down a Massachusetts law banning state procurement from
companies doing business in Burma.3 The Court concluded that the
state law implicitly interfered with a federal act which also sanctioned
235Burma. Despite the lack of an explicit preemption clause in the federal
legislation, the Court found that the state ban interfered with the more
calibrated federal sanctions policy.
2 36
The Supreme Court has also found preemption on the basis of dor-
mant federal powers. For instance, in Zschernig v. Miller, the Supreme
Court invalidated an Oregon probate statute that allowed nonresidents to
inherit property only if the alien could show his home country would not
confiscate the property, and that his home country afforded Americans
reciprocal rights of inheritance. 237 Despite the State Department's deter-
mination that the state statute did not unduly interfere with U.S. foreign
relations, the Court struck down the law. Zschernig suggested any state
laws with "more than some incidental or indirect effect" on foreign af-
fairs would be invalid, regardless of any showing of direct conflict with
federal actions or even any affirmative federal activity in the subject
238area.
232. Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SuP. CT. REv. 175
(2000) (developing this useful taxonomy of preemption cases).
233. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127 (2000).
234. 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
235. Some have interpreted this decision narrowly as allowing state action when the
federal government has not already implemented a sanctions regime and as emphasizing the
importance of congressional, as opposed to executive, action. Brannon . Denning & Jack H.
McCall, International Decisions: Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 750, 754-57 (2000).
236. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 378-79.
237. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
238. Id. at 434-435.
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Zschernig languished until 2003 without any subsequent Supreme
Court treatment, and most academics took it to be an aberration. 29 But in
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Supreme Court may
have reinvigorated the foreign affairs preemption doctrine. 240 The Court
held that executive branch agreements with foreign countries to settle
insurance claims arising out of World War H preempted a California law
forcing information disclosure on insurance companies operating during
World War II. While the executive branch agreements did not expressly
preempt state laws or even address all the countries covered by the Cali-
fornia law, the state policy of forcing broad disclosure was found to
undermine the executive policy of encouraging voluntary establishment
of settlement funds and limiting disclosure of insurance policy informa-
tion. 24, Garamendi renders the future reach of preemption doctrine
uncertain by raising the possibility of independent executive branch pre-
emption authority.242 Sub-federal integration deepens this uncertainty by
raising the question of when treaty rejection or treaty avoidance consti-
tutes a policy sufficient to preempt sub-federal action.
In a novel theoretical turn, Edward Swaine contends that these and
other foreign affairs cases could be better explained under a dormant
treaty power.243 Such a power allows courts to preempt "state authority
even in the absence of any ratified treaty" and proscribes foreign affairs
activities that involve "direct or indirect negotiating ... with foreign
powers on matters of national concern."2" Under such an interpretation
of the Treaty Clause, a state may "engage in ordinary contractual rela-
tions with foreign corporations ... [and] denounce foreign governments
in the strongest terms, regardless of the effects," but it "cannot negotiate
with a foreign power in order to secure concessions. '245 Swaine argues
that such a treaty power flows from the president's authority over treaty• • 246
negotiation. State-level defiance of the president's power (which is
239. For example, in Barclay's Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994),
a case about the dormant commerce clause, the Supreme Court suggested the courts were ill-
suited to adjudicate claims about the need for one voice in foreign relations.
240. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
241. Justice Breyer suggested that Garamendi stands for the proposition that the "Presi-
dent has a degree of independent authority to pre-empt state law." Medellin v. Dretke, 544
U.S. 660, 694 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 949
(2004) (acknowledging that Garamendi could increase executive power, but contending that
Garamendi merely reflected the Court's dissatisfaction with the peculiar and overreaching
scope of the disclosure statute).
243. Swaine, supra note 233, at 1138.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1140.
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sometimes informed by Congress on the front end) should be understood
as a "threat to the successful negotiation-as well as avoidance---of pre-
emptive federal treaties 24 7
Although many instances of sub-federal treaty implementation easily
withstand existing preemption doctrine and theoretical dormant treaty
powers challenges,4 8 some constitutional concerns linger. Under an ex-
pansive interpretation of Garamendi, sub-federal integration that
explicitly (or even implicitly) criticizes the U.S. treaty position may fall
prey to an executive branch preemption argument based on the execu-
tive's position in opposition to the treaty. For example, a city's initiative
urging the federal government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol might inter-
fere with the federal government's ability to speak with one voice on the
Kyoto Protocol or on future treaty issues.249 To take the argument further,
the knowledge that Texas, California, and other large state emitters are
integrating the Kyoto Protocol may undermine the U.S. government's
ability to pressure other countries to make desired concessions.
Yet such a broad reading of Garamendi may run afoul of First
Amendment protections allowing sub-federal entities to express their
views about U.S. foreign policy, treaties, and international relations.20
Moreover, these sub-federal policies do not attempt to secure benefits for
individual cities or states from other countries or change how other
countries act in Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Texas and California would
not be able to join the treaty negotiations, and Congress could still pre-
empt their policies if uniformity were at a premium. These resolutions
can be distinguished from the state actions in Crosby and Garamendi,
which both criticized foreign governments and attempted to limit inter-
actions with those countries in order to change their behavior. Thus,
under Swaine's interpretation of the dormant treaty power, resolutions
criticizing U.S treaty positions ought to be unproblematic.
Ultimately, whatever constitutional limits exist will constrain action
only to the extent that sub-federal actors believe the federal government
247. Id. at 1193.
248. For instance, sub-federal integration of ratified but unimplemented treaties is rela-
tively unproblematic.
249. This argument would likely fail as the executive is explicitly supportive of state and
local initiatives on global warming as in the nation's interests. David R. Hodas, State Law
Responses to Global Warming: Is it Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21
PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 53, 79-80 (2003) (also concluding that state and local greenhouse initia-
tives are "directed solely at local activities" and are thus constitutionally inoffensive).
250. See generally David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1637 (2006). See also Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Ini-
tiatives and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 35 (1999); Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 826-27 (1989). But see MARK YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS:
POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 42-44 (1983).
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will enforce them. In many prior instances of sub-federal activism, the
federal government has been reluctant to intervene. Despite the broad
language in Holmes, states have concluded numerous covenants with
foreign entities, including environmental pacts, without seeking congres-
sional approval. 25' Neither Congress nor the courts have spoken on these
covenants.5  In addition, Congress and the executive branch have never
acted to preempt city ordinances declaring nonbinding nuclear weapons-
free zones; 211 city policies divesting stock from firms doing business in
South Africa; city policies restricting procurement of goods and services
where the bidder for a city contract did business in South Africa;5 4 and
state legislation divesting from Northern Ireland.25' The federal govern-
ment tolerated these policies despite the fact that they actively targeted
the practices of other countries and risked foreign relations disputes.256
Sub-federal integration may be even less objectionable as it is sympa-
thetic to the practices of the international community and unlikely to risk
a rift with another country.
On the other hand, Congress did expressly preempt state anti-boycott
laws, which prohibited state residents from conducting certain transac-
tions with Arab states.251 Similarly, the Justice Department filed suit and
defeated an Oakland ordinance that banned firms from doing weapons
manufacturing work and restricted the transportation of nuclear materials
through the city's jurisdiction.258 Both Crosby and Garamendi suggest
the federal courts may be embracing a more expansive preemption pol-
icy, which may in turn encourage more challenges. This Article raises
some of these questions and suggests some possible answers, but ulti-
mately sub-federal actors will have to see how these challenges play out
in the courts.
251. Peter R. Jennetten, State Environmental Agreements with Foreign Powers: The
Compact Clause and the Foreign Affairs Power of the States, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
141, 169-172 (1995); Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign
Policies, 86 FOREIGN POL'Y 158, 163 (1992).
252. See Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2392-95
(2006).
253. Shuman, supra note 251, at 158.
254. See David D. Caron, The Structure and Pathologies of Local Selective Procurement
Ordinances: A Study of Apartheid-Era South Africa Ordinances, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
159, 160-61 (2003). A suit was filed against the Baltimore ordinance but the Justice Depart-
ment declined to join the suit. Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 726 (Md. 1989).
255. See Howard N. Fenton, III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and
Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 563, 567 (1993).
256. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1223 (1999).
257. Fenton, supra note 255, at 567.
258. United States v. City of Oakland, No. C-89-3305 JPV (N.D. Cal. 1990), available
at http://lic.law.ufl.edu/-nagan/toc34-37.pdf.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The current focus on treaty ratification overlooks an important
mechanism for international norm internalization. Despite some consti-
tutional limitations, unratified and unimplemented treaties can enter the
domestic system through states and localities. As evidenced by the envi-
ronmental and human rights contexts, government actors and
nongovernmental organizations can help integrate treaties into domestic
law in the face of federal lethargy or intransigence.
Sub-federal integration of treaties adds complexity to the compliance
debate between rational choice and norm-based theorists. Sub-federal
integration suggests norm-based theories offer some valuable insights
about the potential of treaties to infiltrate a variety of contexts, and the
managerial school helps illuminate the ways in which treaties influence
the development of sub-federal interests. Still, although sub-federal inte-
gration may slowly change sub-federal interests, rational choice models
suggest that treaty advocates and legal scholars should be skeptical of its
ability to bring about federal ratification.
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